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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the relationships between MOS placement 
and retention of company grade officers.  An officer data file from the Center of Naval 
Analyses is augmented with Total Force Data Warehouse data to create the primary 
analysis data file.  The data set contained officer cohorts from 1994-1999 and 2001 to 
2002, a total of 5,922 newly commissioned officers.  Several five- and six-year 
multivariate retention models are estimated to test the sensitivity of the retention effect of 
MOS preferences and to determine if including prior enlisted Marines in the data affects 
the basic effects.  The objective is to isolate the effects on junior officer retention of MOS 
placement outside of an officer’s top three MOS preferences. 
The findings indicate that MOS placement has a strong negative effect on the 
retention of NROTC, PLC, and OCC graduates.  Among demographic groups, black and 
Asian officers are more likely to retain than white officers.  Significant differences in 
retention do not exist between men and women; however, when prior enlisted officers are 
included in the samples, the sizes of the key coefficients fall in magnitude.  The findings 
for the six-year model indicate no significant effects of MOS placement, gender, or race, 
with and without prior enlistees, on the retention decision of officers who graduate from 
USNA.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Job placement is a crucial milestone in an officer’s career that impacts and shapes 
the officer’s initial tour and follow-on career decisions.  To understand the importance of 
job placement fully, it is necessary to first explore the factors that shape the process.   
Organizational culture and image are an important part of the Marine Corps’ 
identity.  The Marine Corps is the smallest of the four service branches within the 
Department of Defense, but yet has one of the most distinct, robust, and unique service 
cultures.  The men and women who fill its ranks both share and reinforce that identity.  
The Marines are a highly selective organization with a strong cultural allure.  The men 
and women who choose to serve in the Marines do so voluntarily and are carefully 
screened to ensure that the applicant will fit the organization.  Once candidates enter 
service, the Marine Corps invests a great deal in their human capital to shape and ingrain 
behavioral attitudes congruent with the organization’s culture.  This investment typically 
occurs during entry-level indoctrination at Naval Reserve Officer Training Programs, the 
United States Naval Academy, Officer Candidate School, or The Basic School.   
From the very initial decision to serve, applicants must make informed decisions 
about the occupation, environment, and the culture of the prospective services they may 
enter.  Ideally, an applicant would have sufficient information about each service to 
determine if that occupation would fit his or her individual aptitude and interests.  The 
Marine Corps assists applicants in making informed decisions by providing officers with 
ample information, experiences, and real-world application in each of its commissioning 
sources.  Applicants are also provided a host of options and alternatives to prepare them 
for the decision to join the Marines.  This preparation helps to ensure that officers are 
ready to lead Marines.   
Since the Marine Corps utilizes a closed-loop personnel system to recruit, 
develop, and train its future leadership, officers enter the force in large cohorts of entry-
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level applicants who are initially trained to fill company grade positions.  As they 
progress in their careers, officers are trained and developed to fill higher-ranking 
positions.1  This accession and training policy ensures that senior leaders are educated, 
have a wealth of experience, and are well indoctrinated into the Marine Corps 
organization. 
Entry into the officer corps comes from seven main accession programs.  These 
programs include the United States Naval Academy (USNA), Naval Reserve Officer 
Training Course (NROTC), Officer Candidate Course (OCC), Platoon Leader Course 
(PLC), Marine Enlisted Commissioning Education Program (MECEP), Enlisted 
Commissioning Program (ECP), and Meritorious Commissioning Program (MCP).  
Exiting the Marine Corps is done either voluntarily, by honorable discharge, by 
resignation of commission, or by retirement, or involuntarily, through court marital, 
medical disqualification, death, or due to the needs of the Marine Corps.   
Job placement for the majority of newly commissioned Marine officers occurs at 
The Basic School (TBS).  Except for a few select guaranteed contracts into Military 
Occupational Specialties (MOS) such as Judge Advocate (4402), Naval Flight Officer 
(7580), and Pilot (7599), officers must compete for available MOS quotas during their 
training at TBS.  Although Limited Duty Officers (LDO) and Warrant Officers (WO) fall 
into the officer category, LDO’s and WO’s will be excluded from this thesis since they 
are considered restricted line.  Restricted line officers are officers who serve in a 
specialized field and who cannot serve in a command billet.  
The Basic School is a six-month long indoctrination program designed to provide 
all Marine officers with the necessary professional knowledge and skills required to lead 
Marines as company grade officers.  Officers complete rigorous courses of instruction 
both in the field and in the classroom, including leadership, marksmanship, land 
navigation, communications, infantry tactics, weapons, military law, drill, personnel 
                                                 
1 Martha E. Koopman, Creating Innovative Career Paths (Alexandria, VA: Center of Naval Analyses 
January 2006), 6-7. 
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administration, and Marine Corps customs and courtesies.2  All Marine officers are 
required to complete TBS before they can continue their careers in the Marine Corps.   
Not only are the courses at TBS designed to produce quality company grade 
officers, but are also a way to give officers information and experience on a wide breadth 
of MOSs.  Officers are indoctrinated with the knowledge, skills, and abilities required for 
a variety of occupational fields, as well as the work environment and ethics required to be 
successful in those jobs.3  Officers are encouraged to ask questions, interact, and seek 
information from TBS resources and staff on their future potential jobs.  This process 
helps to ensure that officers have sufficient knowledge and experience to make informed 
MOS decisions during the job selection process.   
While at TBS, officers are evaluated and ranked on their performance.  Although 
officers are given the opportunity to list their MOS preferences, they are placed in MOS 
quotas based on the needs of the Marine Corps and their performance ranking.  Every 
effort is made to place an officer in one of his or her top preferences.4  However, since 
every MOS is limited in the number of quotas available, not every officer will receive an 
MOS within his or her top three choices.  
After TBS, officers must attend follow-on MOS training before he or she can 
transition to an MOS-specific job or billet.  All officers leaving TBS will fill a Fleet 
Marine Forces (FMF) billet, typically for three years, upon graduating his or her MOS 
school.5  Once an officer has completed an initial FMF tour, that officer may choose to 
complete another FMF tour or choose a non-FMF billet.  A non-FMF billet may or may 
not have a specific MOS requirement.  However, a non-FMF billet will typically have a 
specific rank requirement.   
                                                 
2 Marine Corps Recruiting Command, http://www.MarineOfficer.com/page/The-Basic-School-O 
(accessed December 1, 2008). 
3 Ibid. 




Graphical displays of typical career paths by a warfare community are provided in 
the Appendix.6  A warfare community is a grouping of MOSs with similar functions.  
The Combat Arms community is populated by MOSs that directly engage in ground 
combat, such as infantry, artillery, and tanks.  The Combat Service Support (CSS) 
community is populated by MOSs that provide supporting functions to the Combat Arms 
MOSs, such as legal, logistics, supply, and administration.  The Aviation community is 
composed of three sub-categories; Air-Ground Support, Rotary Wing, and Fixed Wing.  
The Air-Ground sub-community is composed of MOSs that support aviation, such as 
aviation maintenance and aviation supply.  The Rotary Wing community is composed of 
helicopter aviators.  Likewise, the Fixed Wing community is composed of fixed wing 
aircraft aviators. 
Within each community is a monitor that tracks the available billets for each 
MOS within the Marine Corps.  Each monitor is tasked with managing and scheduling 
officer billet rotations based on the Marine Corps’ manning structure.  As an officer 
comes to the end of one billet assignment, he or she will work closely with his or her 
community monitor to find a suitable future billet.  Assignments are based on the needs 
of the Marine Corps; however, officers are allowed to choose from a list of available 
billets.  This process allows officers to have some input into their next assignment and 
progression of their career path.  
There are, however, certain career tracks within the Marine Corps that deviate 
from the norm.  These tracks require special application by officers and have specific 
qualifications that must be met to allow officers access.  The Special Education Program 
(SEP), Advanced Degree Program (ADP), and International Affairs Officer Program 
provide officers with a secondary or Additional MOS (AMOS) that allows them to fill 
billets outside of their primary occupational field.  This deviation allows them to pursue a 
career path distinctly different from their peers.  The key differences between the two 
tracks are that secondary MOS programs must be self-selected and have qualification 
requirements that exclude some officers from participation.  
                                                 
6 The Basic School, http://www.tbs.usmc.mil/All_MOS_Assignment_Process. 
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An officer who does not receive his or her top MOS preference at TBS may be 
less satisfied with his or her job and prospective career path compared to an officer who 
did receive one of his or her top preferences.  In some cases, these officers may choose to 
leave the Marine Corps to pursue a better job fit in the civilian job market.  Others may 
choose to stay in the Marine Corps due to the retirement benefits, culture, or available 
billet assignments.  The remainder of this thesis will identify the effects of the job 
placement process on the retention of junior officers and demographic groups within the 
junior officer cohorts.  
Regardless of the factors that may affect an officer’s personal retention decision, 
culture plays a significant role in the decision process.  The cultural pull of the Marine 
Corps is distinct and quite strong in its officer corps.  The author hypothesizes that some 
officers may have a taste for the Marine Corps way of life that outweighs the 
dissatisfaction they may receive from a poor job fit.  These officers may be drawn to 
serve and will seek other ways to stay in the Marine Corps outside of their normal career 
path.  By doing so, these officers can alleviate the dissatisfaction from poor job fit and 
remain longer in the Marine Corps by choosing an alternative career path.  The remainder 
of this thesis will identify this group of Marines and determine if taste for the Marine 
Corps culture plays an important role in the decision to select an alternative career path.   
B. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate quantitatively how the placement of 
Marine officers at TBS affects retention, in particular, how failure to receive an MOS in 
their top three preferences affects Marine officers’ retention behavior.  This research will 
focus on the retention aspects of the MOS selection process to determine if officers who 
receive an MOS outside of their top preferences are more likely to separate than officers 
who do receive an MOS within their top three preferences.  Lastly, this research will 
examine the differences in retention for different demographic groups.  
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
1. Primary Research Question 
How does the assignment of an MOS outside of an officer’s top three MOS 
choices affect the retention of newly commissioned officers? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
Are there any demographic groups, such as women or minorities affected more by 
MOS placement than others? 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS  
This thesis is designed to examine the relationships between MOS placement and 
selection on the retention of officers between the ranks of second lieutenant and major.  
The author will analyze officer data obtained from the Total Force Data Warehouse 
(TFDW) and TBS officer cohort data from the Center of Naval Analyses (CNA).  The 
range of the data studied covers a time period from 1994 to 1999 and from 2001 to 2002.  
Officers who fall into the Limited Duty Officer, Warrant Officer, Pilot, Naval Flight 
Officer, and Judge Advocate MOSs will be excluded from the study due to their 
qualification and contractual restrictions.  
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This thesis is organized into six chapters.  Following this introduction, Chapter II 
will provide further details about TBS, the commissioning process, and the job 
selection/placement process.  Chapter III will provide a summary of the methodology, 
techniques, and key findings used in previous literature to expand and justify the 
approaches of this thesis.  Chapter IV will provide a preliminary analysis of the data used 
and summary statistical analysis.  Chapter V will establish the research methodology for 
the regression models, while Chapter VI will provide the results for each of the 
regression models.  Chapter VII will conclude the thesis by summarizing the results, 
conclusions, and recommendations.   
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF MARINE COMMISSIONING SOURCES, 
THE BASIC SCHOOL, THE JOB PLACEMENT PROCESS, 
CAREER PATHS, AND INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS 
A. PURPOSE 
The main purpose of Chapter II is to provide a more robust overview of factors 
outlined in Chapter I that may affect a Marine’s retention and career path choices.  First, 
the chapter will provide background for each commissioning source to show the different 
levels of human capital investment involved with each.  Moving to The Basic School, the 
chapter provides a thorough explanation of the job placement process and how that 
process affects a Marine’s career path upon graduating TBS.  
B. COMMISSIONING SOURCES 
Seven main commissioning sources provide the Marine Corps with its junior 
officer cohorts.  Each program is briefly described below. 
1. United States Naval Academy (USNA)   
Located in Annapolis, Maryland, the United States Naval Academy is a four-year 
resident undergraduate institution that culminates in the rewarding of a Bachelor’s of 
Science degree and commissioning as officers into the Navy or Marine Corps.7  
Applicants must be U.S. citizens, unmarried, not be pregnant, have no dependents, be 
medically qualified, pass a physical fitness test, and be at least 17 years of age, but no 
more than 23 years of age by July 1 of the year they enter the Academy.8  The USNA 
provides a rigorous curriculum that concentrates on the moral, mental, and physical 
education of its midshipmen by immersing them in a stringent four-year resident  
 
                                                 
7 10-12, “Introduction,” USNA Catalog 2007-2008, The United States Naval Academy, 
http://www.usna.edu/Catalog/ (accessed December 5, 2008). 
8 The United States Naval Academy Admissions, http://www.usna.edu/Admissions/steps2.htm 
(accessed December 5, 2008). 
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program.  The Academy is a highly competitive program with a large pool of applicants 
each year.  In 2008, approximately 1,200 of the 14,000 or more applicants were admitted 
as midshipmen.9   
Each year, up to one-sixth (roughly 166 individuals) of the approximate 1,000 
midshipmen graduating may be selected for commissioning into the Marine Corps.10  
Upon graduation, officers incur a five-year active duty service obligation.11  Naval 
Academy graduates incur the longest service obligation of all the Marine commissioning 
services due to the length and cost of the funded education they receive.  
2. Naval Reserve Officer Training Course (NROTC), Marine Option 
The NROTC program is designed to educate and train highly qualified men and 
women for careers as commissioned officers in the Naval service.  The NROTC 
scholarship program pays full tuition, academic fees, subsistence allowances for 
freshmen, book stipends, and uniforms.12  Applicants must be at least 17 years of age by 
September 1 of the year he or she starts college, but less than 23 years of age June 30 of 
the same year.  Applicants must not exceed 27 years of age by June 30 of his or her 
graduation year.  Furthermore, applicants must be a U.S. citizen, obtain a minimum 
combined SAT score of 1000 or ACT 45, meet Marine Corps physical requirements, and 
have no criminal record.13  Midshipmen who graduate and receive a commission from 
the NROTC program are required to serve eight years from the date of commissioning, 
with at least four years on active duty and the remaining four years in the reserves.  A full 
list of requirements can be found in the Fiscal Year 2009 Naval Reserve Officer Training 
Corps, Marine Option Scholarship Program MARADMIN.   
                                                 
9 “United States Naval Academy Class of 2012 Class Profile,” The United States Naval Academy 
Admissions website, http://www.usna.edu/Admissions/ (accessed December 5, 2008). 
10 “Career Opportunities after Graduation,” USNA Catalog 2007-2008, The United States Naval 
Academy, 5, http://www.usna.edu/Catalog/ (accessed December 5, 2008), 149-151. 
11 “Admissions,” USNA Catalog 2007-2008, The United States Naval Academy, 
http://www.usna.edu/Catalog/ (accessed December 5, 2008), 26. 
12 FY2009 NROTC MARADMIN 508/08, 
http://www.marines.mil/news/messages/Pages/MARADMIN508-08 (accessed December 6, 2008). 
13 Marines.USMC.mil, Naval Reserve Officer Training Course Requirements, 
https://www.marines.usmc.mil/G3/Officer/nrotcrequirement.htm (accessed December 4, 2008). 
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3. Platoon Leaders Course (PLC) 
The Platoon Leaders Course is designed for officer candidates who are still 
enrolled in a full-time college.  This course provides individuals with the opportunity to 
attend Officer Candidate School (OCS), located in Quantico, VA, without interrupting 
their academic year.  Officers enrolled in PLC attend two six-week courses at OCS after 
their freshman and sophomore academic years.  Officers enrolled in PLC who are juniors 
complete a ten-week OCS session after their junior year.14  
4. Officer Candidate Course (OCC) 
The OCC is designed to provide college seniors or graduates an opportunity to 
experience the Marine Corps culture and way of life with no commitment to serve.  
Candidates are indoctrinated into the Marine Corps through a 10-week course at OCS.  
At that point, a candidate can voluntarily choose to serve and receive a commission.  
Candidates who accept a commission incur three and one half years of obligated service 
from their date of commissioning.  Immediately upon graduation, officers are sent to TBS 
in Quantico, VA.15  Officer Candidate Course is also used to guarantee some contracts 
into the Judge Advocate Corps and aviation communities before officers enter the Marine 
Corps and job placement process at TBS.   
5. Marine Enlisted Commissioning Education Program (MECEP) 
The MECEP is designed to provide regular active duty enlisted Marines the 
opportunity to earn a college degree and receive a commission into the Marine officer 
corps.  Applicants must have a minimum of six years of active service and have attained 
the rank corporal or above.  Applicants must also score a minimum of 1000 on the SAT, 
with a minimum 400 on verbal, and must be at least 21 years old, but no more than 26 by 
the July 1 of the application year.  A complete list of application requirements can be 
                                                 
14 Marine Corps Recruiting Command, http://www.MarineOfficer.com/page/Platoon-Leaders-Class-O 
(accessed December 3, 2008). 
15 Marine Corps Recruiting Command, http://www.MarineOfficer.com/page/Officer-Candidate-Class-O 
(accessed December 3, 2008). 
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found in Marine Corps Order (MCO) 1560.15L.16  Officers commissioned via MECEP 
incur a 4-year minimum service obligation upon graduation and commissioning.17  Upon 
commissioning, officers will attend OCS for Marine officer training.      
6. Enlisted-to-Officer Commissioning Programs 
This commissioning program consists of two categories detailed below. 
a.   Enlisted Commissioning Program (ECP) 
The Enlisted Commissioning Program is designed to allow qualified 
regular Marine Corps and Marine Corps Active Reserve (AR) to apply for assignment to 
OCS and subsequent appointment to the unrestricted officer corps.18  Applicants must 
obtain a bachelor’s level degree from an accredited regional college or university prior to 
application.  Applicants must also be a U.S. citizen, achieve a minimum combined score 
of 1000 on the SAT or a combined score of 45 on the ACT, and must be at least 21 years 
of age, but less than 30 years of age at the date of commissioning.19  Upon graduation 
from OCS and commissioning, officers must serve a minimum of eight years, with at 
least four years on active duty and four years in the reserves.20  A full list of requirements 
can be found in MCO1040.43A Enlisted-to-Officer Commissioning Programs.  
b.   Meritorious Commissioning Program (MCP) 
The MCP allows commanding officers the ability to nominate highly 
qualified enlisted Marines in the regular and active reserves who do not yet have a 
bachelor’s level degree, but have demonstrated exceptional leadership potential for 
appointment to OCS and subsequent commissioning in the Marine Corps Reserves.  
Applicants must have successfully earned an Associate’s degree or completed 75 
                                                 
16 Marine Corps Order 1560.15L Marine Corps Enlisted Commissioning Education Program, August 
16, 1994, 1. 
17 Ibid., 2. 
18 Marine Corps Order 1040.43A Enlisted-to-Officer Commissioning Programs, May 2, 2000, 1. 
19 Ibid., 3-4. 
20 Ibid. 10. 
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semester hours or more of unduplicated college work at a regionally accredited college or 
university.21  Upon graduation from OCS and commissioning, officers must serve a 
minimum of eight years, with at least four years on active duty and four years in the 
reserves.22  A full list of requirements can be found in MCO1040.43A Enlisted-to-Officer 
Commissioning Programs.  
C.   THE BASIC SCHOOL 
The Basic School (TBS) is an entry-level officer training school located in 
Quantico, Virginia designed to train officers from every Marine commissioning source as 
a provisional rifle platoon commander.  The twenty-six week training period includes 
junior officer evaluation in three major areas: Military Skills, Academics, and Leadership 
abilities.23  The training regiment encompasses physical fitness tests, weapons training, 
live fires, marksmanship, infantry tactics, graded examinations, leadership role-playing, 
counseling, mentorship, and instructor evaluations.  As the training progresses, officers 
are scored and evaluated on their performance in each area by the instructors and 
company staff.  The Military Skills, Academic, and Leadership scores are combined to 
create an overall cumulative score, which is used to create a class ranking of the best to 
worst performances.  The class ranking is then later used to decide which officers will 
have the first chance for job placement.   
Specific jobs in the Marine Corps are designated as a Military Occupational 
Specialty (MOS) and coded with a four digit numeric code.  The first two digits serve to 
identify the specific occupational field.  The second two digits designate a specific task or 
billet within that occupational field.  Currently, there are approximately 26 MOS’s, which 





                                                 
21 Marine Corps Order 1040.43A Enlisted-to-Officer Commissioning Programs, 4. 
22 Ibid., 10. 
23 The Basic School, http://www.tbs.usmc.mil/All_MOS_Assignment_Process. 
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Figure 1.   Current Officer Military Occupational Specialties 
MOS DESCRIPTION     CATEGORY 
0180 – Adjutant      Combat Service Support 
0202 - Intelligence Officer     Combat Service Support 
0203 - Ground Intelligence Officer    Combat Service Support 
0204 - Human Source Intelligence Officer   Combat Service Support 
0206 - Signal Intel Ground Electronic Warfare Officer  Combat Service Support 
0207 – Air Intelligence Officer    Combat Service Support 
0302 – Infantry Officer     Combat Arms 
0402 – Logistics Officer     Combat Service Support 
0602 – Command and Control Systems Officer  Combat Service Support 
0802 – Field Artillery Officer     Combat Arms 
1302 – Combat Engineer Officer    Combat Arms 
1802 – Tank Officer      Combat Arms 
1803 – Amphibious Assault Vehicle Officer   Combat Arms 
3002 – Ground Supply Officer    Combat Service Support 
3404 – Comptroller      Combat Service Support 
4302 – Public Affairs Officer     Combat Service Support 
4402 – Judge Advocate     Combat Service Support 
5803 – Military Police Officer    Combat Service Support 
6002 – Aircraft Maintenance Officer    Aviation 
6602 – Aviation Supply Officer    Aviation 
7204 – Low Altitude Air Defense Officer   Aviation 
7208 – Air Support Officer     Aviation 
7210 – Air Defense Control Officer    Aviation 
7220 – Air Traffic Control Officer    Aviation 
7580 – Naval Flight Officer     Aviation 
7599 – Pilot       Aviation24 
                                                 
24 The Basic School, http://www.tbs.usmc.mil/All_MOS_FAQ (accessed December 9, 2008). 
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D.   THE JOB PLACEMENT PROCESS 
Starting in 1977, the Commandant of the Marine Corps mandated that a quality 
spread would be applied to the assignment of TBS graduates to MOSs.  A quality spread 
would ensure that each occupational field received a fair share of high quality lieutenants.  
This policy is still in effect today under the guidance of the Marine Manpower Officer 
Assignment Division (MMOA), stating that one-third of all job quotas for each MOS will 
come from the top, middle, and bottom thirds of each TBS company.  Within each third, 
class standing will be the primary means for MOS assignment.25   
Aside from technical training, officers are provided information on different 
occupational fields through MOS mixers, enlisted Marine interaction, training exercises, 
basic studies, and online MOS references.  Officers are encouraged to seek out jobs that 
highlight their specific strengths and interests.  Using the information they have obtained, 
officers will formally submit their MOS choices in order of preference, the first as the 
most desirable and the last as their least desirable, to their TBS Company chain-of-
command for job placement at approximately the fourteenth week of training.26    
During this phase, officers with a guaranteed contract are factored out of the class 
standings.  Guaranteed contracts are for three main categories; Judge Advocates (4402), 
Naval Flight Officers (7580), and Pilots (7599).  The remaining officer cohort is divided 
into thirds based on class standing; the top, middle, and bottom.  For example, if the 
cohort without guaranteed contracts was composed of 99 officers, the cohort would be 
ranked from 1 to 99, with 1 being the top performing officer.  The cohort would then be 
broken into equal thirds, one to thirty-three, thirty-four to sixty-six, and sixty-seven to 
ninety-nine.  The available jobs are then divided equally among the thirds.  Job 
availabilities are provided to the TBS company staff by MMOA-3 (Plans, Programs, and 
System Support) based on the current manpower structure requirements for each MOS.27 
                                                 
25 The Basic School, http://www.tbs.usmc.mil/All_MOS_Assignment_Process. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid.   
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Once the class has been divided into thirds, officers are then placed into available 
MOSs starting with the top Marine in each third.  Thus, a Marine has a better chance of 
receiving one of his or her top MOS choices if he or she is at the top of his or her third.  
Conversely, a Marine has a smaller chance of receiving his or her top choice if he or she 
is near the bottom of his or her third.  Once all the MOS quotas have been filled, the 
company staff can consider deviating from the student officer’s preferences to meet the 
needs of the Marine Corps.  For example, the company staff may deem that a Marine at 
the bottom of a third who received an MOS outside of his or her top three preferences 
may be a better fit for an MOS filled by someone higher in that particular third.  In this 
circumstance, the staff may swap MOS’s in a limited manner to ensure a better job fit to 
meet the needs of the Marine Corps.  This deviation is subject to the discretion of the 
staff and approval of the Company Commander.28 
The final list of job placements is then submitted to the Commanding Officer 
(CO) of TBS.  Any officer who did not receive an MOS within his or her top three 
preferences is briefed to the CO.  The CO must approve the list before it is submitted to 
Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) for final approval.  Once M&RA approves the 
list, it is then released to the officer cohort.  On average, approximately 75% of 
lieutenants receive an MOS within their top three preferences.29   
E.   CAREER PATHS 
As discussed in Chapter I, officers are required to complete an MOS-specific 
school before filling a fleet billet after TBS.  The length of training varies depending on 
the Marine’s specialty.  Once MOS training is complete, officers are sent to the fleet to 
fill an MOS-specific billet.  The Fleet Marine Force (FMF) billet serves to establish a 
base for the individual’s technical experience, provide company grade billet 
development, and provide the Marine Corps a return on investment from the general and 
organizational-specific training Marine officers are provided.   
                                                 
28 The Basic School, http://www.tbs.usmc.mil/All_MOS_Assignment_Process. 
29 Ibid. 
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Normal career paths are specific to each occupational field; however, some 
generic characteristics are similar across all MOSs.  Two common characteristics among 
all MOS’s are FMF and non-FMF billets.  An FMF or fleet billet is defined as a job 
specific to a MOS or occupational field.  A non-FMF billet is a billet that may or may not 
have a specific MOS qualification requirement.  Non-FMF billets do, however, have rank 
requirements.  For example, a Marine who enters the Combat Service Support (CSS) 
occupational field is expected to fill a FMF billet directly upon graduation from his or her 
PMOS school.  Once the initial tour is complete, a CSS officer is expected to move to a 
non-FMF billet to expand the officer’s experience, before accepting an additional FMF 
tour.  Depending on each officer’s preferences, this expected order may or may not be the 
case.  In many situations, a CSS officer may choose to select a FMF-billet directly upon 
completing the first FMF tour before continuing to a non-FMF billet.  The Appendix 
provides charts depicting the typical career paths for each occupational field.30   
F. RANK PROGRESSION 
After completing TBS, most officers enter the Marine Corps at the rank of second 
lieutenant (O-1).  There are a few exceptions, such as some JAG officers who may enter 
TBS as a first lieutenant, but these officers are excluded from this thesis.  From the date 
of commissioning, promotion to the rank of first lieutenant (O-2) and captain (O-3) is 
fairly predictable and expected.  Promotion to O-2 typically occurs two years after the 
date of commissioning.  Promotion to O-3 typically occurs two to three years after the 
date of rank for O-2.  Thus, a typical officer will acquire the rank of O-2 or O-3 at the end 
of his or her mandatory service obligation.   
This rank progression is not the case for promotion to major (O-4).  Promotion to 
this rank can range from eight to ten years of commissioned service.  The rank of O-4 is 
also significant because each individual in zone for promotion is scrutinized by a 
promotion board, making the process much more competitive.  Due to the length of  
 
 
                                                 
30 The Basic School, http://www.tbs.usmc.mil/All_Career_Progression (accessed December 9, 2008). 
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service and promotion board requirements, promotion is not guaranteed.  Many officers 
may also leave the service before this decision point, retire after twenty years of total 
service, or simply may not be selected by the promotion boards.  
G. SUMMARY 
In summary, the commissioning sources outlined in Chapter II provide the Marine 
Corps with a wide range of differing levels of human capital investment.  However, 
regardless of the commissioning source, every officer enters The Basic School to be 
trained as a provisional rifle platoon commander.  During training at The Basic School, 
officers are provided a sufficient level of MOS education to provide Marines with the 
information needed to make informed MOS preference decisions.  During the selection 
process, the Marine Corps attempts to place Marines within one of their top MOS 
choices.  The outcomes of the selection process affect not only a Marine’s initial tour, but 




III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the issue of fit and job placement have long-term implications for an 
individual’s job satisfaction, several factors must be considered when constructing 
models to determine the propensity for someone to stay in the Marine Corps based on job 
preferences and the propensity for an individual to seek alternative career paths.  To 
conduct an analysis on the research questions successfully, the author plans to examine a 
variety of methods and approaches that may provide relevant solutions to specific 
portions of this research. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This section of the literature review provides a background on the general 
ordering of the retention model from the date of commissioning to the retention decision 
point.  Numerous studies have been done on the aspects of retention.  For the purpose of 
this thesis, the author is going to focus on Ronald Fricker’s 2002 RAND article, “The 
Effects of Perstempo on Officer Retention in the U.S. Military.”  
Ronald Fricker analyzes the effects of deployment tempo on the retention of two 
groups: junior officers (O-2s to O-3s) after the initial tour obligation between the fourth 
and fifth year of commissioned service, and midgrade officers (O-3s to O-4s).  Since 
most junior officers incur a mandatory service obligation upon commissioning, Fricker 
structured the junior officer model differently than the midgrade officer model.  He 
argues that junior officers do not, initially, have the information needed to make an 
informed career decision.  Officers who chose to stay beyond the initial service obligation 
are distinctly different from those who chose to leave.  Officers who stay must be more 
informed to make a clear career decision to stay.  Officers who choose to stay also do not 
incur further service obligation, giving them the ability to resign at different points.31  
                                                 
31 Ronald Fricker, The Effects of Perstempo on Officer Retention in the U.S. Military (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2002), 20. 
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Using these junior officer characteristics, Fricker was then able to specify a 
logistic regression to predict the log odds of retention for the junior officer group up 
through the six-year decision point.  He used the six-year point based on the five-year 
minimum service obligation of service academy graduates with an added year to account 
for individuals who may not have had the opportunity to leave exactly at the expiration of 
their obligated service.32  While other commissioning sources may have shorter periods 
of obligated service, the same retention assumptions hold true.  Officers who choose to 
leave the military, will have done so by their six-year point.   
Since midgrade officers have key distinctions from junior officers, and midgrade 
officers have the ability to separate from the service at any time after their initial service 
obligation, Fricker used survival analysis to estimate officer hazard ratios for retention.33  
Fricker then separated his analysis into two major divisions.  The first division was 
designed to account for differences between service branches by specifying separate 
statistical models for each service.34  The second division was designed to account for 
temporal changes over the total time frame of the study by specifying each model for an 
early and late 90s range.35  
After accounting for other observable characteristics, such as occupation and 
demographics in the logistic regression model, Fricker concluded that deployment tempo 
had several key effects on the retention of officers.  The first was that increased non-
hostile deployment tempo had a positive association with retention for both junior and 
midgrade officers.  He also learned that hostile deployments had negative effects on the 
retention of junior officers, but either mitigated or had potentially positive retention 
effects for midgrade officers.36  The author attributed this small effect to potential self- 
 
 
                                                 
32 Fricker, The Effects of Perstempo on Officer Retention in the U.S. Military, 5, 22. 
33 Ibid., 29. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 30. 
36 Ibid., 35. 
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selection effects, since officers who advance beyond their initial tour obligation make a 
conscious career decision to stay.37  The last finding was that lack of deployment time 
had a negative effect on the retention for junior officers.  
C.   VARIABLES 
1. Deployment Tempo 
Three categories of deployment information based on the data available are used 
in specifying the regression models used in this thesis.  The three areas necessary for the 
regression models are the following: Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) deployed days, 
Non-GWOT deployed days, and crisis area locations.  
Fricker created a deployment tempo variable using Imminent Danger Pay and 
Family Separation Allowance pay data.  The deployment variable was further divided 
into two types of deployments, hostile and non-hostile.38  Both variables were found to 
be significant factors in determining the log odds of retention for junior officers.39   
In 2006, Aline Quester, Anita Hattiangadi, and Robert Shuford used deployment 
tempo as an independent variable to determine the effects of post-9/11 deployments on 
the retention of Marines with and without dependents in their research article, “Marine 
Corps Retention in the Post-9/11 Era: The Effects of Deployment Tempo on Marines 
with and without Dependents.”  Deployment tempo was defined as the number of days 
spent away from home and was measured by summing five categories to create an 
independent variable deployed days.  The five categories include operational days, 
exercise days, unit training days, home station days, and mission support temporary duty 
(TDY).40  The independent variable deployed days was then tabulated based on the 
deployment data for the previous 42 months’ deployment tempo and further divided into 
                                                 
37 Fricker, The Effects of Perstempo on Officer Retention in the U.S. Military, 37. 
38 Ibid., 9. 
39 Ibid., 33. 
40 Aline O. Quester, Anita U. Hattiangadi, and Robert W. Shuford, Marine Corps Retention in the 
Post-9/11 Era: The Effects of Deployment Tempo on Marines with and without Dependents (Alexandria, 
VA: Center of Naval Analyses, January 2006), 7.  
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100-day increments.  They hypothesized that for every extra 100 days a Marine was 
deployed in the 42 months prior to the retention decision, the dependent binary variable 
retention would be affected.41   
The authors also created a binary variable for crisis operations that captured 
whether an officer had ever deployed to Afghanistan or Iraq using DMDC crisis 
deployment information42.  Based on the periods outlined by the study, operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq were considered to be hostile.  Both variables were found to be 
statistically significant in predicting the retention of officers.43  
In addition, Quester, Hattiangadi, and Shuford found that deployment tempo was 
positively correlated with retention rates.  For all years of service groups, officers were 
more likely to be retained if they were deployed to a crisis area or the more they 
deployed.  The positive effects between retention and deployment tempo were the same 
for Marines with and without dependents, and for retirement and non-retirement eligible 
officers.44 
2. General Classification Test (GCT) Scores 
A Marine’s mental ability is an important factor for this thesis for a number of 
reasons.  A Marine who possesses more cognitive ability may have a competitive 
advantage over other Marines.  He or she may be able to achieve higher performance 
rankings or promote faster.  Similarly, Marines with higher cognitive ability may be more 
likely to seek follow-on education through civilian institutions or through the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  The Marine Corps has a variety of methods to identify Marines 
with higher cognitive ability for job placement and as a program screener for certain 
programs, such as aviation.  The General Classification Test (GCT) is one such test.   
                                                 
41 Quester, Hattiangadi, and Shuford, Marine Corps Retention in the Post-9/11 Era: The Effects of 
Deployment Tempo on Marines with and without Dependents, 35. 
42 Ibid., 6. 
43 Ibid., 34. 
44 Ibid., 30-31. 
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The GCT is given to all Marine officers at the beginning of their military careers 
during TBS as an evaluation tool similar to the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude 
Battery (ASVAB) and Armed Forced Qualification Test (AFQT).  Per MCO 1230.5A, 
the GCT is designed to evaluate mental abilities.45  Scores are then recorded in the 
TFDW database and maintained in the officer’s service record.  Since the GCT is 
specifically designed to evaluate mental abilities, this observable variable may be an 
important proxy to reduce unobserved variable bias due to an individual’s mental ability.   
In 2008, Bowling, Stimpson, and Hiatt used GCT scores as a variable to show the 
initial cognitive abilities of an officer at TBS.  However, the authors made the clear 
distinction that this variable could not capture an individual’s potential, skills, or 
capabilities gained over a career.46  The authors found that there was a statistically 
significant difference in the mean score between officers who did and did not attend NPS.  
Summary statistics also showed that GCT scores for Marines at NPS were slightly higher 
than non-NPS Marines.   
Quester and Hiatt created two binary variables using GCT scores as a proxy for 
ability when analyzing the promotion of officers to the rank of major.  The two binary 
variables used were Upper-Half GCT Scores for scores above 125 and above, and Lower-
Half GCT Scores for those who scored 124 and below.  The authors found that there was 
a small, yet significant difference between the promotion rates of officers in each GCT 
half.47   
Although Bowman and Mehay did not use GCT scores, they were able to use a 
similar proxy in their 1998 article, “Graduate Education and Employee Performance: 
Evidence from Military Personnel.”  In the article, the authors use an individual’s college 
GPA score as a proxy for cognitive ability of Navy officers.  The authors found that 
college GPA was a statistically significant conditional factor that was correlated with 
                                                 
45 Marine Corps Order 1230.5A Classification Testing, December 15, 2008, 6. 
46 Kirby Bowling, Dan Stimpson with Cathy Hiatt, The Effect of Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) on 
the Promotion of Marine Corps Officers (Alexandria, VA: Center of Naval Analyses, April 2008), 15. 
47 Aline O. Quester and Catherine M. Hiatt, Final Report: Street-to-Fleet Study. Volume II: Street-to-
Fleet for Commissioned Officers (Alexandria, VA: Center of Naval Analyses, February 2005), 24-25. 
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ability and the likelihood of someone attending graduate school.48  When included with 
an individual’s early performance rating, the coefficient of the binary Master’s degree 
variable in their regression models of promotion was reduced by approximately 20 
percent.49   
3. Source of Entry 
An officer’s source of entry is an observable characteristic that provides insights 
into an officer’s education, background, and training.  For instance, an officer 
commissioned from an enlisted commissioning source has already received a large 
amount of military specific human capital investment from the Marine Corps by 
completing boot camp and has a better understanding of the Marine culture and work 
environment through application of knowledge, skills, and abilities in the FMF.  
Therefore, prior-enlisted officers should have more information needed to make a career 
path decision than an officer should from a commissioning program, such as OCC, that 
provides less military specific training.   
Bowman and Mehay used commissioning source as a proxy for affective skills 
gained before commissioning.  The authors found that Naval Academy graduates had a 
higher promotion probability than all other accession sources, all else equal.  Since the 
Naval Academy is four-year resident program, this finding supports the notion that 
USNA graduates receive a larger amount of human capital investment compared to other 
commissioning sources.50  
In 2006, Doganca found that commissioning sources were statistically significant 
in determining the survival rates of Army officers in each, year-of-service (YOS) 
category.51  He also found that the type of occupation was a significant factor in 
                                                 
48 William R. Bowman and Stephen L. Mehay, “Graduate Education and Employee Performance: 
Evidence from Military Personnel,” Economics of Education Review 18 (1998): 457. 
49 Ibid., 457-48. 
50 Ibid., 456. 
51 Erkan Doganca, Officer Career Paths and the Effects of Commissioning Sources on the Survival 
Patterns of Army Officers (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, September 2006), 126-127.  
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determining the hazard ratios for officers leaving the Army.52  Similarly, Korkmaz found 
that each commissioning source had different survival rates for Naval officers and that 
survival rates varied significantly by designator or occupation.53  
4. TBS Third Ranking 
A Marine’s TBS third ranking is significant for a number of reasons.  A Marine’s 
ranking is based on a number of factors that capture a Marine’s abilities.  TBS rankings 
also represent a Marine’s potential fit in the Marine Corps based on the company staff’s 
perceptions of that Marine’s attitudes, determination, and potential leadership ability.  
The end result, as highlighted in Chapter II, is that a Marine’s TBS ranking is an 
important factor in predicting MOS Placement.    
Quester, Hattiangadi, Lee, and Shuford found that officers ranked in the top third 
of their TBS class were more likely to be retained over time.  Similarly, Wiler and 
Hurndon found that officers in the top third of their TBS class received higher fitness 
report evaluations than officers in the middle third.  Officers in the middle third, likewise, 
received higher scores than officers in the lower third of the same TBS class.54  
Bowling, Stimpson, and Hiatt found that officers in the top and lower thirds of 
their TBS class who also graduated from NPS are less likely to be promoted to lieutenant 
colonel than their peers in the same third.  However, officers who were in the middle 
third of their TBS class and attended NPS fared better for promotion to lieutenant colonel 
than their peers in the same third.  
McHugh et al., used a Marine’s TBS graduation third as a proxy for officer 
quality in their regression analysis of promotion rates.  They found that there are 
substantial differences in quality across PMOSs for Marines that are in-zone for 
                                                 
52 Doganca, Officer Career Paths and the Effects of Commissioning Sources on the Survival Patterns 
of Army Officers, 125-127. 
53 Ibrahim Korkmaz, Analysis of the Survival Patterns of United States Naval Officers (Master’s 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2005), 109. 
54 Darby Wiler and Nicholas Hurndon. An Analysis of Performance at The Basic School as a Predictor 
of Officer Performance in the Operating Forces (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 
2008), 89.  
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promotion for captain, major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel.55  Nine MOSs had more 
than 40% of an in-zone population that was in the lower TBS third.  Also six MOSs that 
had more than 40% of the in-zone population were in the top TBS third.  The authors also 
used MOS preferences to determine differences in MOS preferences across TBS thirds.  
They found that 48% of Marines in the top third chose PMOS 0302 (Infantry Officer) 
vice only 22% of Marines in the bottom third.  They conclude that Marines in the top 
TBS third choose MOSs significantly differently from Marines in the lower third.56  
Quester and Hiatt created binary variables for each TBS third to proxy for officer 
quality in their analysis of promotion rates of Marine Corps officers to the rank of major.  
The authors found a strong positive association between TBS third and promotion to 
major.  Officers in the top third had a 43.6% chance of reaching major vice only 22.1% 
for officers in the lower third.57   
5. Length of Service 
Since the Marine Corps operates under a closed loop personnel system with 
substantial retirement incentives for those officers who make it to the 20-year vesting 
point, total length of service may affect a Marine’s decision process to stay.   
Quester, Hattiangadi, and Shuford analyzed the effects of deployment tempo on 
retention of Marines with and without dependents by dividing each group into years of 
service categories.  The study analyzed officers making a retention decision between 
March 2004 and March 2005.58 The year of service (YOS) categories included 4 to 6 
years of service, 9 to 11 years of service, 12 to 18 years of service, and retirement eligible  
 
                                                 
55 Cathleen M. McHugh, Holly A. Potter, Maj. Dan Stimpson, USMC, Michael J. Moskowitz, and 
Aline O. Questor with Dana L Samuelson and Ian D. MacLeod, Analyses of the Marine Corps Officer 
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56 Ibid., 67. 
57 Quester and Hiatt, Final Report: Street-to-Fleet Study. Volume II: Street-to-Fleet for Commissioned 
Officers.  
58 Quester, Hattiangadi, and Shuford, Marine Corps Retention in the Post-9/11 Era: The Effects of 
Deployment Tempo on Marines with and without Dependents, 3. 
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officers.59  There were distinct differences in the retention of officers depending on their 
YOS group.  The authors noted that the largest drops in retention occurred at the end of 
the 4 to 6, the 9 to 11, and retirement-eligible years of service categories.60   
Hansen and Moskowitz used years of service as an independent variable when 
analyzing the retention of aviators in their research article, “The Effect of Compensation 
on Aviator Retention.”  Based on the available sample, the authors created binary 
variables for years of service between three and 13 years.  They found a negative 
relationship between retention and the time a person spent in the Navy.  The longer a 
person spent in the Navy before completing the minimum service requirement, the less 
likely that person would stay in the Navy.61 
6. Occupational Group 
Although a Marine may have a specific preference for an individual MOS, he or 
she may also have a preference for a community of MOS’s that may affect future career 
decisions based on that community’s culture or perceptions of a typical career path for 
advancement.  Bowling, Stimpson, and Hiatt found that a Marine’s occupational field 
was important in predicting both participation at NPS and probability of promotion.  A 
combat arms MOS, such as 0302 infantry, had lower participation rates at NPS.  
Likewise, MOS 0302 officers who graduated from NPS had a lower probability of 
promoting to lieutenant colonel.  The author’s attribute this to the heavy requirements for 
these career tracks to gain operational experience.  Occupational fields such as Finance or 
Supply, which may be more closely aligned to their degrees and have higher returns to 
education, fared much better for promotion and NPS attendance.62  
                                                 
59 Quester, Hattiangadi, and Shuford, Marine Corps Retention in the Post-9/11 Era: The Effects of 
Deployment Tempo on Marines with and without Dependents, 37. 
60 Ibid., 26. 
61 Michael L. Hansen, and Michael J. Moskowitz, The Effect of Compensation on Aviator Retention 
(Alexandria, VA: Center of Naval Analyses, November 2006), 68.  
62 Bowling, Stimpson, and Hiatt, The Effect of Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) on the Promotion of 
Marine Corps Officers, 27-30. 
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D. SUMMARY 
Based on the literature reviewed, the retention models used in the literature define 
the retention variable at the 6-year point from an officer’s date of commissioning.  The 6-
year decision point is inclusive for all commissioning sources and provides a sufficient 
buffer to exclude officers who wish to leave the military, but do not have the opportunity 
to leave exactly upon the expiration of obligated service.   
Also many observable variables may affect a Marine’s decision to stay in the 
military and/or to seek an alternative career path.  A Marine’s retention and career path 
decisions are complex and cannot fully be predicted due to the scope of unobservable 
factors, which affect each individual.  The point of this thesis is to use variables that may 
have a significant impact on those decisions and to use variables that have proven to be 
significant factors in other studies.  The variables listed in this review represent credible 
factors, such as an officer’s total amount of deployment days, TBS third ranking, GCT 
scores, source of entry, length of service, and occupational group, that may affect an 
officer’s choice to remain in the military or seek an alternative career path based on that 
officer’s MOS placement.   
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IV.   DATA SOURCES, VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS, AND 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
There are several purposes for this chapter.  The first is to provide background 
information on the data used to conduct the statistical analysis.  The second is to provide 
information on the variables used such as variable definitions and summary statistics 
from the samples.  Finally, this chapter will provide an overview of the data using key 
variable tabulations and descriptive statistics. 
A. DATA SOURCES 
1. Center of Naval Analyses (CNA) Officer File 
The Center of Naval Analyses (CNA) collects and stores panel data for Marine 
officers.  The database contains general demographic information on newly 
commissioned officers, such as race, gender, marital status, number of dependents, and 
TBS performance information, such GCT scores, graduating third, military performance 
variables, and TBS class academic rankings, military skills, and leadership rankings.  As 
each individual progresses in his or her career, information is recorded on pay grade, rifle 
and pistol scores, physical fitness test scores, and date of rank for each progressive rank 
up to the rank of lieutenant colonel.  
The database also includes general information on each individual’s TBS class 
size, commissioning source, top three MOS preferences, and PMOS held at each rank.  
The annual range for the TBS file is from 1980 to 2006.  Since the TBS Officer File 
consists of only officer data, this file was used as the master file for merging additional 
datasets.  An individual that does not match the TBS file has been dropped from the 
sample.    
2. Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) Dataset 
The TFDW database contains information for all officer and enlisted Marine 
personnel.  The TFDW data used for this thesis consist of several smaller datasets that 
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were merged to the TBS Officer File.  The cumulative TFDW Officer File includes 
officer demographics, commissioning sources, and officer service information.  This file 
also includes years of service, pay entry base dates, and days deployed during the Global 
War on Terrorism (GWOT) and during peacetime.     
B. RETENTION SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The retention model sample consists of approximately 5,922 Marine ground 
officers from TBS fiscal year cohorts 1994 to 1999 and 2001 to 2002.  The original data 
file contained fiscal year cohorts 1980 to 2006.  However, fiscal years 1980 to 1993 and 
2000 were excluded from the sample because those years did not have any MOS 
preference information.  Since the models examine retention for junior officers to the 5-
year and 6-year decision points, fiscal years 2003 to 2006 were excluded because officers 
in these cohorts have not yet had the opportunity to reach the 5-year or 6-year decision 
points.  Table 1 provides general information on the cumulative sample.   
 
Table 1.   Retention Model Sample General Information 
Details Number of Observations % of Sample 
Initial Sample  37,080 100% 
Missing or Deleted 31,158 84.0% 
Final Sample 5,922 16.0% 
C. VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
This section provides an overview of each variable along with its definition in 
Table 2 and descriptive statistics in Table 3 for each dependent and independent variable.  
Military Occupational Specialties such as aviators, judge advocates, and warrant officers 
are excluded from the sample and are not included in either table.  Likewise, officers who 
were listed as deceased while on duty were excluded from the sample, and not included 
in either table, since these officers may or may not have had the opportunity to reach the 
retention decision point.  This group represents a very small portion of the initial sample.  
Officers who were commissioned from MCP, MECEP, or ECP were also excluded from 
the sample, since these officers will have a longer length of total service and may be 
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driven by other factors, such as retirement, when making a retention decision.  Therefore, 
the MCP, MECEP, and ECP officers will be distinctly different from other officers in the 
sample.   
Note that for each of the key independent variables, such as gender, race, marital 
status, TBS third, occupational field, and total MOS preference received, the total 
percentage of the sample for each category cumulatively equals 100 percent.  For these 
key variables, missing or incomplete information was deleted from the sample.  Specific 
information and qualifications for each variable are outlined below.   
 






DEPENDENT     
 Retention to 
the 5-year point
Retained Binary 1=Retained 
0=otherwise 
 Retention to 
the 6-year point
Retained Binary 1 = Retained 
0 = otherwise 
INDEPENDENT     
Demographics Gender Female Binary 1 = Female 
0 = Male 
  Male Binary 1 = Male 
0 = Female 
 Race/Ethnicity White Binary 1 = White 
0 = otherwise 
  Black Binary 1 = Black 
0 = otherwise 
  Asian Binary 1 = Asian 
0 = otherwise 
  Hispanic Binary 1 = Hispanic 
0 = otherwise 















  RaceDeclined Binary 1=Declined Race 
0=otherwise 
 Marital Status Married Binary 1 = Married 
0 = otherwise 
  Single Binary 1 = Single 
0 = otherwise 
  Divorced Binary 1 = Divorced 
0 = Otherwise 
 Number of 
Dependents 
Dependents Continuous Add 1 for each 
dependent 
Service Info Commissioning 
Source 
USNA Binary 1 = USNA officer 
0 = otherwise 
  NROTC Binary 1 = NROTC officer 
0 = otherwise 
  PLC Binary 1 = PLC officer 
0 = otherwise 
  OCC Binary 1 = OCC officer 
0 = otherwise 
  MECEP Binary 1 = MECEP officer 
0 = otherwise 
  ECP Binary 1 = ECP officer 
0 = otherwise 
  MCP Binary 1 = MCP officer 
 TBS Third Top Binary 1 = Top Third grad 
0 = otherwise 
  Middle Binary 1 = Middle Third 
grad 
0 = otherwise 
  Lower Binary 1 = Bottom Third 
grad 
0 = otherwise 






First MOS Binary 1 = Received 1st 
MOS choice 
0 = otherwise 
  Second MOS Binary 1 = Received 2nd 
MOS choice 
0 = otherwise 
  Third MOS Binary 1 = Received 3rd 
MOS choice 







  Other MOS Binary 1 = Did not receive 
one of first 3 MOS 
choices 





Binary 1 = Combat Arms 
MOS 
0 = otherwise 
  Combat 
Service 
Support 
Binary 1 = CSS MOS 
0 = otherwise 
  Air-Ground 
Support 
Binary 1 = Air-Ground 
Support MOS 






MOS Code  
Binary  1 = PMOS 
0 = otherwise 









100 Day Increments 
 Education 
Status 
civmasters Binary 1=Ever Earned a 
Master’s Degree 
0=otherwise 
 Wounded in 
Action Status 
WIA Binary 1=Wounded in 
Action 
0=otherwise 




Binary 1 = Fiscal Year 
0 = otherwise 
 
Table 3.   Descriptive Statistics for All Variables 


















Top  0.32 0.47
Middle  0.31 0.46
Lower  0.37 0.48
First MOS 0.43 0.50
Second MOS 0.14 0.35

















































Prior Enlisted 0.14 0.35
daysdepl 3.22 2.99
5-Year Retained 0.80 0.40
USNARetained 0.19 0.39
Total Observations  5922
1. Retention Dependent Variable 
Since neither the TFDW nor the CNA datasets contained valid information on the 
specific separation date for each officer, the binary retention variables were constructed 
using the dates of rank variables provided in the CNA file.  Each officer’s second 
lieutenant date of rank was used to mark the date of first commissioning.  Elapsed time 
from the date of first commission was then created for each subsequent rank.  For 
example, elapsed time was measured between the date of commissioning to the rank of 
O-2, the date of commissioning to the rank of O-3, and the date of commissioning to the 
rank of O-4.  Since some officers may not promote to each of the ranks listed above, the 
elapsed time had to be measured for each rank. 
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For the five-year model, the officer receives a value of 1 for the Five-Year 
Retained variable if the officer was commissioned from NROTC, PLC, or OCC and the 
officer’s total years of service for any rank equaled or exceeded five years.  The officer 
receives a value of 0 for the Five-Year Retained variable if the officer’s total years do not 
exceed five years.  For the six-year model, the officer receives a value of 1 for the USNA 
Retained variable if the officer was commissioned from the USNA and the officer’s total 
years of service for any rank equaled or exceeded 6 years.  Likewise, the officer receives 
a value of 0 for the USNA Retained binary variable if his or her total elapsed years of 
commissioned service were less than 6 years.   
The five-year decision point for retention is based on the four-year minimum 
service requirement for NROTC, PLC, and OCC graduates plus one additional year to 
account for variance in operational commitments or service extensions.  The Five-Year 
Retained variable is defined as: 
 
1 = if officer has 5 years or more of commissioned service 
0 = if officer has less than 5 years of commissioned service 
  
The six-year decision point for retention is based on the five-year minimum 
service requirement for Naval Academy graduates plus one year to account for variance 
in operational commitments or service extensions.  To summarize, the binary variable 
USNA Retained is defined below. 
 
1 = if officer has 6 years or more of commissioned service 
0 = if officer has less than 6 years of commissioned service 
 
Based on the sample summary statistics, approximately 4,039 of the 5,073 five-
year officers remained in the Marine Corps beyond the five-year MSR, while only 173 of 
the 676 six-year sample stayed in the Marine Corps beyond the six-year MSR.  This 
represents a 79.6% retention rate for NROTC, PLC, and OCC and only a 25.6% retention 
rate for USNA graduates.   
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2. Demographic Independent Variables 
a. Gender 
The two gender variables, M and F, used in this thesis were constructed 
using information from the CNA Officer File.  This variable was chosen over other 
gender variables from the TFDW data file because CNA file offered complete 
observations for each officer.  Based on the final sample, approximately 9% of the 
sample is female and 91% is male.   
b. Race/Ethnicity  
There are several variables in both the CNA Officer File and TFDW 
datasets that describe an officer’s race or ethnicity.  The ethnicity terms categorize 
individuals on approximately 28 separate ethnic categories, while the race variables for 
both datasets have six categories, denoting American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, 
Black/African American, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, White and declined to 
respond.  One key downside of using the race variable is that it does not have a category 
for Hispanics.  However, the CNA file does have two separate dummy variables for 
Blacks and Hispanics. 
Combining information from both variables, I constructed race/ethnicity 
indicators, consisting of the following categories:  White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, 
American Indian and Native Alaskan, Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander, and 
Declined to Respond.  Even though the Native American/Alaska Native variable 
represented only 29 observations and the Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander variable 
represented only five observations, these categories were maintained in the sample.  
Likewise, the officers who declined to respond for the race category were also included 
under the RaceDeclined variable.  Any missing observations were then dropped from the 
sample.  From the data, Whites compose the majority of the sample with 4,627, followed 
by 544 Blacks, 449 Hispanics, 160 RaceDeclined, 108 Asians, 29 American Indian and 
Alaska Native, and five Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander.  The sample by percentage  
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is as follows:  78% White, 9% Black, 8% Hispanic, 3% RaceDeclined, 2% Asian, less 
than 1% American Indian and Alaska Native, and less than 1% Native Hawaiian and 
Pacific Islander.  
c. Marital Status 
The marital status variable is divided among three categories and is 
defined as single, married, and divorced.  There were no observations of officers under 
the categories of annulled or legally separated. Since many officers change their marital 
status after commissioning and some officers may not reach the rank of O-3, the author 
chose to use the marital status at the officer’s promotion to O-2.  This point was also 
chosen because many officers will make the decision to retain prior to reaching the actual 
5-year or 6-year decision points.  Thus, the officer’s marital status at the O-2 rank may be 
in the proper range for the retention decision and may play an important role in its 
decision.  From the basic sample summary statistics, approximately 55% of the officers at 
the rank of O-2 are single, while only approximately 43% are married.  
d. Number of Dependents 
The number of dependents variable is a cumulative variable that measures 
the total number of dependents as recorded in the CNA Officer File at an officer’s 
promotion to O-2.  Each dependent is counted as one.  For example, a Marine with three 
dependents would have a value of 3 for this variable.  
3. Service Independent Variables 
a.  Commissioning Source Variables 
The commissioning source variables are a group of binary variables that 
record each officer’s commissioning source.  Background information on each 
commissioning source can be found in Chapter II of this thesis.   
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Both the CNA Officer and TFDW files provide variables denoting an 
officer’s commissioning source.  The final binary terms were constructed using two 
sources of entry variables from the CNA file.  The first variable provides very clear 
source of entry information based on only seven categories.  However, this variable was 
incomplete for the sample and represented only approximately one-forth of the total 
officers.  The second variable was very detailed, offering information for approximately 
one hundred sources of entry categories, including types of commissioning sources, 
programs, and contracts.  In many cases, the variable categories did not match a specific 
source of entry, were too vague, or were outdated.  These observations were recoded as 
missing before matching them to the first variable.  Any missing sources of entry were 
then dropped from the sample.  Dummy variables were also created, based solely off the 
seven commissioning sources outlined in Chapter II of this thesis.  
In some cases, such as the enlisted commissioning programs, an individual 
may have participated in multiple programs, such as ECP and OCC.  In these cases, 
individuals were recoded to denote the enlisted commissioning program vice OCC, since 
ECP outlines more specifically an officer’s amount of human capital investment and 
OCC is effectively the officer’s training at Officers Candidate School.  The following 
outlines each binary variable. 
 
NROTC = 1 if commissioned via NROTC, 0 if not 
PLC  = 1 if commissioned via PLC, 0 if not 
OCC  = 1 if commissioned via OCS, 0 if not 
USNA  = 1 if commissioned via the Naval Academy, 0 if not 
 
The mean commissioning source values in Table 3 represent the 
percentages of officers from each commissioning source included in the sample.  From 
the summary statistics, PLC has the highest participation rate at approximately 30%, 
followed by OCC at 29%, NROTC at 26%, and USNA at 14%.  As outlined above, an 
individual who went to ECP, may have been coded as an OCC participant in either the 
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CNA or TFDW files.  For those Marines who may have appeared in multiple 
commissioning sources across the dummy variables, the enlisted commissioning 
programs were used as the default vice OCC or PLC.  This assumption was able to 
correct some observations, but it is impossible to resolve the miscoding problem 
completely.   
Based on current participation rates advertised on the MarineOfficer.com 
webpage for the Marine Corps recruiting command, commissioning source participation 
rates are as follows: 35% PLC, 24% OCC, 15% NROTC, and 14% USNA.63  The sample 
may be overrepresented for OCC and NROTC graduates, but underrepresented by PLC.  
Even though some programs may be over or underrepresented, this does not detract from 
the regression models since the main focus of this thesis is to determine the effect of 
MOS placement on retention, not the amount of early human capital investment on 
retention.    
b. TBS Graduation Third 
The CNA dataset contains information on which TBS class third an officer 
was placed in for his or her graduating class.  A binary variable was created for each third 
using the following logic.   
 
Top   = 1 if officer was in the top 1/3 of a TBS class, 0 if not 
Middle  = 1 if officer was in the middle 1/3 of a TBS class, 0 if not 
Lower  = 1 if officer was in the lower 1/3 of a TBS class, 0 if not 
 
Based on the descriptive statistics in Table 3, the Top, Middle, and Lower 
thirds do not exactly match the theoretical third distribution outlined in Chapters I and II 
of this thesis.  The top third represents 32%, the middle 31%, and the lower 37 percent.  
This variance is due to several factors.  The first is that TBS classes vary in size and will 
not be exactly divisible by one third.  The second is that the TBS company staff has some 
                                                 
63 Marine Corps Recruiting Command, http://www.MarineOfficer.com/page/Earning-a-Commission-O 
(accessed January 4, 2009). 
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leeway in dividing each class, providing an option to increase or decrease the distribution 
based on staff preferences.  Based on the sample above, it appears that the tendency is to 
group more officers in the lower third.   
c. Prior Enlisted Variable  
There are no specific prior enlisted variables in either the CNA Officer 
File or TFDW data files; however, several categories within existing variables indicate a 
Marine’s enlisted service record.  Using the commissioning source, any officer 
commissioned from MCP, MECEP, or ECP would have enlisted service prior to 
commissioning.  Any officer who participated in one of these categories was denoted as 
prior enlisted; however, these commissioning sources do not provide information on 
every prior enlisted officer. 
Officers commissioned through the Naval Academy or NRTOC could 
have prior enlisted service in either the Navy or Marine Corps.  Officers who 
accumulated over three years of enlisted service acquire an enlisted designator “E” on 
their company grade rank through the rank of captain.  This characteristic is denoted as 
an O-1E, O-2E, or O-3E.  Using the present grade category, any officer with an “E” 
designator is coded as a prior enlisted service member.  Approximately 14% of the 
officers in the sample have prior enlisted experience.  The following outlines the 
definition of the prior enlisted binary variable. 
 
Prior = 1 if the officer was prior enlisted, 0 if not 
 
d. MOS Preference Received 
Before MOS placement, each officer will list his or her preferences in 
numerical order from most preferable to least preferable for the MOS’s available.  The 
CNA maintains MOS preferences for each Marine for the first three MOS preferences.  
Using these preferences and the Marine’s actual MOS placement, the author created  
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binary variables capturing whether an officer had received one of his or her top three 
preferences or had received an MOS outside of his or her top preferences by matching 
these preferences to the officer’s actual PMOS received. 
To execute this, the author chose to use the officer’s PMOS at the rank of 
O-2.  By this point in their careers, many officers will have completed their PMOS 
School and be designated with their PMOS code vice a student MOS code.  In some 
cases, officers retained the student MOS code.  The author assumes that these officers 
successfully completed their MOS schools and recoded any student MOS’s with the 
correlating PMOS code.  
One limitation is that the CNA Officer File only has MOS preference 
information for fiscal years 1994-1999, 2001 and 2002.  Since the primary research 
question involves only those officers who have reached the 5-year or 6-year retention 
decision points, officer cohorts later than 2002 were excluded.   
 
First MOS = 1 if the Marine received his/her first MOS, 0 if not 
Second MOS = 1 if the Marine received his/her second MOS, 0 if not 
Third MOS = 1 if the Marine received his/her third MOS, 0 if not 
Top3MOS = 1 if the Marine received one of their top 3 MOS preferences,  
   0 if not  
OtherMOS = 1 if the Marine did not receive one of their top MOS preferences,  
   0 if not 
 
The TBS website states that, on average, approximately 75% of each 
graduating class has received an MOS within his or her top three MOS preferences, 83% 
will receive on of their top five preferences, and 93% will receive one of their top 10 
MOS preferences.64  Based on the summary statistics, approximately 67% of officers 
receive one of their top three MOS preferences.  The remaining 33% did not receive an 
                                                 
64 The Basic School, http://www.tbs.usmc.mil/All_MOS_Assignment_Process. 
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MOS within their top three MOS preferences.  The average variance between the 
advertised percentage and the sample percentage may be due to a number of factors.  One 
factor may be due to the omission of pilots and JAG officers.  Another factor may be due 
to improved job placement over time due to policy changes, such as optimization.  When 
summarized by TBS fiscal year, the average for receiving a top three MOS choices for 
2001 and 2002 is approximately 71 percent.  For 1994 to 1999, the average is 
approximately 64 percent.   
e. Occupational Field 
Occupational fields are groupings of like MOSs that serve similar 
purposes in the Marine Corps.  As described in Chapter I of this thesis, these fields 
represent a broader community rather than one specific PMOS.  The three occupational 
fields of interest for this thesis are Combat Arms (CA), Combat Service Support (CSS), 
and Air-Ground Support (AGS).  If an officer’s PMOS received matches one of the 
MOS’s within an occupational field, the officer will be coded with 1 for that occupational 
field.   
This variable is introduced to account for differences across service 
communities that may either entice or discourage someone from selecting that MOS as a 
career opportunity.  For instance, an individual may list a combat arms MOS for each of 
his or her top MOS choices in hopes of entering that type of community.  Contrarily, 
some officers may find they dislike the combat arms environment from their experiences 
at TBS and choose a different community in hopes of avoiding the combat arms 
occupational field.   
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The definition for each variable is listed below. 
CA  = 1 if PMOS code equals 0302, 0802, 1302, 1802, 1803, zero if otherwise 
CSS = 1 if PMOS code equals 0180, 0203, 0204, 0206, 0207, 0402, 0602,  
  3002, 3404, 4302, 5803, zero if otherwise 
AGS = 1 if PMOS code equals 6002, 6602, 7204, 7208, 7210, 7220, zero if  
   otherwise 
Based on the sample, approximately 50% of the sample goes into the CSS 
occupational field, while 39% go into CA, and 11% go into AGS.  The CA occupational 
field has the smallest number of MOS’s but the largest number of billets per each MOS.  
The CSS community has the largest number of MOS’s but a smaller amount of billets per 
each MOS.  The AGS occupational field has a small number of MOS’s and a small 
numbers of billets within each MOS.     
f. Primary MOS  
The primary MOS category includes binary variables for each of the 
PMOSs available to officers who graduate TBS and is based on an individual’s actual 
MOS assignment.  This field is designed to capture occupational characteristics that may 
affect an individual’s retention and career path decisions.  A complete list of the variable 
definitions is provided below. 
0180 = 1 if the officer has a 0180 PMOS, 0 if not  
0202 = 1 if the officer has a 0202 PMOS, 0 if not  
0203 = 1 if the officer has a 0203 PMOS, 0 if not  
0204 = 1 if the officer has a 0204 PMOS, 0 if not  
0206 = 1 if the officer has a 0302 PMOS, 0 if not  
0207 = 1 if the officer has a 0302 PMOS, 0 if not  
0302 = 1 if the officer has a 0302 PMOS, 0 if not  
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0402 = 1 if the officer has a 0402 PMOS, 0 if not  
0602 = 1 if the officer has a 0602 PMOS, 0 if not  
0802 = 1 if the officer has a 0802 PMOS, 0 if not  
1302 = 1 if the officer has a 1302 PMOS, 0 if not  
1802 = 1 if the officer has a 1802 PMOS, 0 if not  
1803 = 1 if the officer has a 1803 PMOS, 0 if not  
3002 = 1 if the officer has a 3002 PMOS, 0 if not  
3404 = 1 if the officer has a 3404 PMOS, 0 if not  
4302 = 1 if the officer has a 4302 PMOS, 0 if not  
5803 = 1 if the officer has a 5803 PMOS, 0 if not  
6002 = 1 if the officer has a 6002 PMOS, 0 if not  
6602 = 1 if the officer has a 6602 PMOS, 0 if not  
7204 = 1 if the officer has a 7204 PMOS, 0 if not  
7208 = 1 if the officer has a 7208 PMOS, 0 if not  
7210 = 1 if the officer has a 7210 PMOS, 0 if not  
7220 = 1 if the officer has a 7220 PMOS, 0 if not  
g. Days Deployed 
The days deployed variable derived from the TFDW’s database for Global 
War on Terrorism (GWOT) and Non-Global War on Terrorism days deployed.  For each 
category in the TFDW, days deployed are measured by one day increments.  To simplify 
the data range and provide a more realistic quantity, the days deployed variable was 
constructed to measure the total amount of time a Marine is deployed in 100 day 




number of deployed days exceeds a 100-day increment, the variable is rounded to the 
next highest number.  For example, a Marine deployed for a total of 350 days would have 
a 4 recorded for the days deployed variable.   
h. TBS Cohort Years 
Since the primary thesis question involves the impacts of job placement on 
retention, binary variables were created for each of the TBS cohort fiscal years.  These 
fiscal year dummy variables account for differences in the economy or service that may 
be unobservable at the point the officer enters the Marine Corps.  The first year dummy 
starts at the 1994-year cohort.  The last year dummy is for the 2002-year cohort.  The 
total range is from 1994-1999 and from 2001 to 2002.  Fiscal year 2000 was excluded 
from the range, since there were no MOS preferences for that TBS cohort.  
D. CROSS-TABULATIONS BY TBS THIRD, GENDER, RACE, AND FISCAL 
YEAR 
1. Key Variables by TBS Third 
There are several key differences between observable characteristics across the 
TBS thirds.  The first difference is gender.  The percentage of each third that is female 
progressively gets larger as the third rank lowers.  Approximately 4% of the top, 7% of 
the middle, and 15% of the lower third is composed of females.  This suggests that 
females do not perform as well as males at TBS.  Another variable is race/ethnicity.  
Whites make up approximately 88% of the top third, 83% of the middle, and only 65% of 
the lower third.  This difference suggests that Whites perform better at TBS than other 
races/ethnicities.   
The mean GCT scores for each TBS third also shows that academic ability may 
be related to an officer’s TBS performance, since officers scored 128.4 on average in the 




significant portion of an officer’s cumulative ranking, it is practical that an officer’s GCT 
scores are positively related to his or her academic performance, and thus, the officer’s 
TBS third.   
The largest numbers of prior enlisted Marines were ranked in the top third of their 
TBS graduating classes, which suggests that prior enlisted Marines may have a 
competitive advantage over other officers due to their previous experiences, education, 
and training as enlisted Marines.  Likewise, Marines in the top third appear to receive 
their top MOS preferences more often on average than the middle or lower thirds.  The 
number of days deployed, however, did not vary substantially over each third.  Finally, 
the top third has the highest retention rate of any third, followed by the middle, and lower 
third groups for both MSR groups.   
Table 4 provides overall summary statistics of each key variable by TBS third.   
  
Table 4.   Key Variables by TBS Third 
 Top TBS Third Middle TBS Third Lower TBS Third 
Variable       Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Female 0.04 0.20 0.07 0.26 0.15 0.36
Male 0.96 0.20 0.93 0.26 0.85 0.36
White 0.88 0.32 0.83 0.38 0.65 0.48
Asian 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.16
Black 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.24 0.16 0.37
Hispanic 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.24 0.11 0.31
AIAN 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.08
NHPI 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03
RaceDeclined 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.19
o2_married      0.50 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.38 0.49
o2_single      0.48 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.60 0.49
o2_divorced      0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.16
o2_depndts      0.84 1.16 0.63 1.00 0.58 0.96
GCT      128.43 9.76 124.76 9.12 120.43 8.81
civmasters   0.12 0.32 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29
OCC 0.39 0.49 0.29 0.45 0.22 0.41
PLC 0.22 0.41 0.30 0.46 0.39 0.49
NROTC 0.23 0.42 0.27 0.45 0.27 0.44
USNA 0.16 0.37 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.33
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 Top TBS Third Middle TBS Third Lower TBS Third 
Variable       Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Prior Enlisted 0.21 0.41 0.12 0.32 0.10 0.30
daysdepl 3.33 2.87 3.22 2.97 3.12 3.10
WIA 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.08
First MOS 0.54 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.34 0.47
Second MOS 0.12 0.33 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.36
Third MOS 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.32
Top3MOS 0.73 0.44 0.66 0.47 0.60 0.49
OtherMOS 0.27 0.44 0.34 0.47 0.40 0.49
5-Year Retained 0.84 0.37 0.80 0.40 0.77 0.42
USNARetained 0.22 0.42 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.37
  1886  1838  2198
 
2. Key Variables by Gender  
There are several significant gender differences between the key independent 
variables.  The racial spread for males closely follows the overall cumulative sample 
percentages.  Females are slightly more likely to be from a minority group and are also 
more likely to be single and divorced than males.  When comparing males and females by 
GCT scores, females score on average 1.73 points lower than males.   
One of the most significant differences appears when comparing males and 
females by TBS third.  Females are much more likely to rank in the middle to lower 
thirds than males.  Based on the sample, approximately 62% of females rank in the lower 
third.  Conversely, males are relatively evenly divided across each TBS third.   
When compared by commissioning sources, females have a higher rate of 
participation for OCC at 33% compared to just 29% for males.  Likewise, the USNA as a 
source of entry is more prevalent for females than males.  Approximately 21% of female 
officers receive a commission from the USNA versus only 14% of male officers.  The 
NROTC program appears to have the largest disparity between males and females as a 
commissioning source.  Approximately 27% of males enter the Marine Corps from 
NROTC, vice only 13% of females.  
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Based on general service information, females are slightly less likely to have prior 
enlisted experience.  Approximately 12% of female officers are prior enlisted, while 
approximately 15% of the male sample is composed of prior enlisted officers.  Female 
officers also have a lower total deployed time on average than male officers.  Since the 
deployed days variable includes officers who may not have deployed, the mean shows 
only the deployed time for the specific sample gender.  The mean does not show the 
average length of time for those who actually deployed.  This variance suggests that 
females are either deployed less or for a shorter amount of time on average than males.    
Lastly, females are less likely to receive their first MOS preference when 
compared to males.  Approximately 34% of females receive their top MOS preference as 
compared to 44% of males.  However, females are slightly more likely to receive one of 
their second or third MOS preferences than males.  For those Marines who receive an 
MOS outside of his or her top three MOS preferences, the difference is negligible at 
approximately 33% for females and 34% for males.   
 
Table 5.   Key Variables by Gender 
 Females  Males  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
White 0.74 0.44 0.79 0.41
Asian 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13
Black 0.12 0.32 0.09 0.29
Hispanic 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.26
AIAN 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.07
NHPI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
RaceDeclined 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.16
o2_married 0.30 0.46 0.44 0.50
o2_single 0.64 0.48 0.54 0.50
o2_divorced 0.06 0.23 0.02 0.13
o2_depndts 0.24 0.58 0.73 1.07
GCT 122.75 10.03 124.48 9.76
civmasters 0.12 0.33 0.10 0.30
Top  0.14 0.35 0.34 0.47
Middle  0.24 0.43 0.32 0.47
Lower  0.62 0.49 0.35 0.48
OCC 0.33 0.47 0.29 0.45
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 Females  Males  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
PLC 0.33 0.47 0.30 0.46
NROTC 0.13 0.34 0.27 0.45
USNA 0.21 0.41 0.14 0.34
Prior Enlisted 0.12 0.32 0.15 0.35
daysdepl 2.46 2.94 3.29 2.98
WIA 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.13
First MOS 0.34 0.48 0.44 0.50
Second MOS 0.19 0.39 0.14 0.34
Third MOS 0.14 0.35 0.09 0.28
Top3MOS 0.67 0.47 0.66 0.47
OtherMOS 0.33 0.47 0.34 0.47
5-Year Retained 0.80 0.40 0.80 0.40
USNARetained 0.13 0.34 0.19 0.39
Total Observations 546  5376
3. Key Variables by Race/Ethnicity  
Tabulating the key independent variables by race/ethnicity shows clear variations 
across several important variables.  The first is between the mean GCT scores.  On 
average, Whites scored 125.68 on the GCT.  While Asians scored fairly close to Whites 
on average at 122.22, Blacks scored 117.36 and Hispanics scored 119.55 on average.  
Since GCT scores provide an insight into an individual’s cognitive abilities, individuals 
who score higher on the GCT may score higher on academic examinations.  Since 
academic scores comprise a significant portion of a student officer’s cumulative ranking 
at TBS, officers who score higher on the GCT may have a higher class rank, and 
therefore, reach a higher TBS third.   
When the races/ethnicities were compared across TBS thirds, Whites had a 
relatively even distribution, with a slight prevalence to be ranked in the top third.  Non-
Whites, however, do not have the same even distribution.  Non-Whites are much more 
prevalent to rank in the lower and middle TBS thirds.  Based on the sample, 66% of 
Black Marine officers will rank in the lower third.  Approximately 54% of Hispanic 
officers and 51% of Asian officers will rank in the lower third.  
 49
The distribution of officers into each of the sources of entry is much more closely 
related.  Non-Whites are slightly more prevalent in enlisted commissioning programs.  
This is highlighted by the Prior variable, which indicates that Non-Whites are much more 
likely to be prior enlisted than Whites.  Approximately 24% of Black officers, 25% of 
Hispanic officers, and 17% of Asian officers have prior enlisted service, compared to 
only 12% of White officers.  This difference may be due to socio-economic reasons 
rather than a racial/ethnicity bias.  In some cases, Non-Whites may have fewer 
opportunities to attend college than Whites.  As enlisted Marines, these individuals would 
have the opportunity to use the GI Bill or other enlisted commissioning programs to 
attend college.   
Non-Whites also have slightly less probability of receiving their first MOS 
preference or one of their top three choices cumulatively.  Approximately 45% of White 
officers will receive their first MOS preference on average.  Based on the sample, only 
37% of Black officers, 34% of Hispanic officers, and 42% of Asian officers will receive 
their first MOS preferences.  Similarly, Non-White officers are more likely to receive an 
MOS outside of their top three MOS preferences.  Approximately 37% of Black officers, 
34% of Hispanic officers, and 42% of Asian officers will not receive one of their top 
three MOS preferences, compared to 33% of Whites.   
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Table 6.   Key Variables by Race/Ethnicity 
 White  Black  Hispanic Asian  AIAN  NHPI  RaceDeclined 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.Mean Std. Dev.Mean Std. Dev.Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.Mean Std. Dev.Mean Std. Dev.
Female 0.09 0.28 0.12 0.32 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.35
Male 0.91 0.28 0.88 0.32 0.90 0.30 0.90 0.30 0.93 0.26 1.00 0.00 0.86 0.35
White 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Asian 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Black 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hispanic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AIAN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NHPI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RaceDeclined 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
o2_married 0.41 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.37 0.49 0.62 0.49 0.60 0.55 0.36 0.48
o2_single 0.57 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.61 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.40 0.55 0.62 0.49
o2_divorced 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.14
o2_depndts 0.62 0.98 1.05 1.34 0.93 1.17 0.65 1.08 1.41 1.43 1.60 1.82 0.53 0.93
GCT 125.68 9.56117.36 8.83119.55 8.52122.22 8.91122.62 8.99123.00 19.35123.99 8.99
civmasters 0.09 0.29 0.18 0.38 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30 0.03 0.19 0.20 0.45 0.10 0.30
Top 0.36 0.48 0.13 0.33 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.40 0.28 0.45 0.40 0.55 0.22 0.41
Middle 0.33 0.47 0.21 0.41 0.26 0.44 0.30 0.46 0.24 0.44 0.20 0.45 0.26 0.44
Lower 0.31 0.46 0.66 0.47 0.54 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.51 0.40 0.55 0.53 0.50
OCC 0.30 0.46 0.27 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.17 0.37 0.14 0.35 0.60 0.55 0.43 0.50
PLC 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.35 0.48 0.38 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.20 0.45 0.26 0.44
NROTC 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.43 0.24 0.43 0.31 0.46 0.28 0.45 0.20 0.45 0.20 0.40
USNA 0.14 0.35 0.18 0.38 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.21 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.31
Prior Enlisted 0.12 0.32 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.17 0.37 0.28 0.45 0.40 0.55 0.11 0.32
daysdepl 3.26 2.99 2.73 2.74 3.24 3.04 3.72 2.93 2.83 3.57 3.40 4.98 3.39 3.26
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 White  Black  Hispanic Asian  AIAN  NHPI  RaceDeclined 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.Mean Std. Dev.Mean Std. Dev.Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.Mean Std. Dev.Mean Std. Dev.
WIA 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.14
First MOS 0.45 0.50 0.37 0.48 0.38 0.49 0.32 0.47 0.48 0.51 0.40 0.55 0.36 0.48
Second MOS 0.14 0.34 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.37 0.19 0.39 0.14 0.35 0.20 0.45 0.16 0.37
Third MOS 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33 0.07 0.26 0.14 0.35 0.20 0.45 0.11 0.32
Top3MOS 0.67 0.47 0.63 0.48 0.66 0.48 0.58 0.50 0.76 0.44 0.80 0.45 0.64 0.48
OtherMOS 0.33 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.34 0.48 0.42 0.50 0.24 0.44 0.20 0.45 0.36 0.48
5-Year Retained 0.79 0.40 0.84 0.36 0.82 0.38 0.86 0.35 0.72 0.45 0.80 0.45 0.82 0.39
USNARetained 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.16 0.37 0.18 0.38 0.03 0.19 0.20 0.45 0.16 0.37
  4627 544 449 108 29 5 160
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4.  Key Variables by Fiscal Year 
Several key variables have mean distributions that vary over time when tabulated 
by fiscal year.  Gender and Marital Status distributions are fairly consistent over time.  
Likewise, there is a relatively even distribution of officers for each TBS third over time, 
with slightly larger percentages in the lower third.  Meanwhile, the average GCT scores 
have actually gone down on average over time since 1994.  The average scores in 1994 
were 126.44, while the average scores in 2002 were 123.17. 
One key element of the fiscal year tabulation is the change in deployment time 
over the years.  The deployed days mean increases for each new fiscal year; with over a 
one hundred day increase on average for fiscal years 2001 and 2002.  This increase seems 
to follow the annual progression of the Global War on Terrorism.  As new cohorts enter 
the Marine Corps, newly commissioned officers would enter deployable billets and have 
a direct opportunity to deploy.  Earlier cohorts would be at different points in their career 
paths and may or may not have as much opportunity to deploy.   
On average, the magnitude of the variable civmasters has gone down substantially 
over time.  Approximately 17% of officers in 1994 had a Master’s degree, but only 4% 
for 2001 and 3% for 2002.  This negative trend could be directly related to the increased 
operational tempo due to the Global War on Terrorism.  Officers in later fiscal year 
cohorts could have less time to pursue a Master’s degree than officers from earlier 
cohorts. 
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Table 7.   Key Variables by Fiscal Year 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.Mean Std. Dev.Mean Std. Dev.Mean Std. Dev.Mean Std. Dev.Mean Std. Dev.Mean Std. Dev.
F 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.28 0.10 0.30 0.14 0.34
M 0.93 0.26 0.92 0.27 0.90 0.30 0.92 0.27 0.90 0.30 0.92 0.28 0.90 0.30 0.86 0.34
White 0.82 0.38 0.81 0.39 0.76 0.43 0.78 0.41 0.74 0.44 0.77 0.42 0.78 0.41 0.80 0.40
Asian 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.14
Black 0.09 0.28 0.07 0.25 0.12 0.33 0.10 0.31 0.11 0.32 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26
Hispanic 0.06 0.23 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.25
AIAN 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.04
NHPI 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RaceDeclined 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.19 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19
o2_married 0.42 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.40 0.49
o2_single 0.57 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.58 0.49
o2_divorced 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16
o2_depndts 0.56 0.84 0.63 0.92 0.81 1.15 0.51 0.96 0.74 1.12 0.79 1.11 0.75 1.14 0.64 1.05
GCT 126.44 10.13125.16 9.32124.57 9.49124.75 9.92123.57 9.87123.39 9.61123.66 9.44123.17 10.38
civmasters 0.17 0.37 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.17
Top 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.31 0.46 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.34 0.47
Middle 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.47 0.29 0.46 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.32 0.46 0.31 0.46
Lower 0.38 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.38 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.38 0.49 0.38 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.35 0.48
OCC 0.28 0.45 0.19 0.39 0.29 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.36 0.48 0.34 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.20 0.40
PLC 0.34 0.47 0.21 0.40 0.23 0.42 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.26 0.44 0.34 0.47 0.23 0.42
NROTC 0.30 0.46 0.49 0.50 0.26 0.44 0.21 0.41 0.11 0.32 0.28 0.45 0.19 0.39 0.28 0.45
USNA 0.07 0.26 0.12 0.33 0.22 0.41 0.12 0.33 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.34 0.10 0.30 0.29 0.45
Prior 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.22 0.12 0.33 0.22 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.18 0.39
daysdepl 2.32 3.17 2.51 3.14 2.77 2.99 3.18 3.21 3.13 2.91 3.20 2.82 4.43 2.46 4.37 2.26
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WIA 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.14 0.06 0.24
First MOS 0.26 0.44 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.45 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.44 0.50
Second MOS 0.09 0.29 0.15 0.35 0.10 0.30 0.14 0.34 0.16 0.37 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.37 0.15 0.35
Third MOS 0.06 0.25 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.31 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.32 0.09 0.28
Top3MOS 0.41 0.49 0.73 0.45 0.67 0.47 0.65 0.48 0.72 0.45 0.69 0.46 0.74 0.44 0.67 0.47
OtherMOS 0.59 0.49 0.27 0.45 0.33 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.28 0.45 0.31 0.46 0.26 0.44 0.33 0.47
5-Year Retained 0.82 0.39 0.81 0.40 0.81 0.39 0.84 0.37 0.84 0.37 0.81 0.39 0.71 0.45 0.76 0.43
USNARetained 0.43 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.45 0.50 0.24 0.43 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.06
  680 735 620 861 832 912 774 508
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5.  Key Variables by Retention 
Several key distinctions exist between officers who stayed in the Marine Corps 
beyond the 5- and 6-year retention points and officers who chose to leave.  Although 
females are more prevalent in the 6-year sample, there is no difference in the percentages 
between those that leave and those that stay for either MSR model.  The same is not true 
for race/ethnicity.  White officers have a slightly lower retention rate for the 5-year 
model, but a higher retention rate for the 6-year model.  When compared by marital 
status, the percentage of married Marines that stay for both MSR models is higher than 
the percentage of single Marines.  This somewhat supports the notion that the Marine 
Corps recruits single Marines, but retains families.  
The GCT scores between the officers who stay and leave the Marine Corps are 
effectively the same; however, there is a significant difference in the TBS third rankings.  
Officers ranked in the top third are much more likely to stay in the Marine Corps than 
officers in the middle or lower thirds.  Approximately 33% of the officers who retain 
were ranked in the top third compared to just 31% for the middle and 36% for the lower 
thirds for the 5-year model.  When compared to those officers that left the Marine Corps, 
the largest difference is between the top and lower thirds.  The distribution of those that 
left the Marine Corps is weighted much more towards the lower third with approximately 
45% of those that separated.  Only 25% of those that separated were from the top third.  
For the 6-year model, approximately 39% of officers that stayed in the Marine Corps 
were from the top third, 34% from the middle, and 28% from the lower.  The six-year 
model is weighted much more towards the top third for officers who stay in the Marine 
Corps.  Even though the retention rate for the middle and lower thirds goes down, the 
lower third is more likely to leave the Marine Corps than the middle third.  The 
percentage difference between those officers that separated from the Marines vice stayed 
for the middle third is just 1%, vice 9% for those officers ranked in the lower third for the 
5-year model.  Likewise, the difference is 4% for the middle and 6% for the lower third 
for the 6-year model. 
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There is also a significant difference between prior enlisted officers who stay and 
leave the Marine Corps.  Approximately 12% of officers who stay are prior enlisted, vice 
only 8% of the officers who choose to leave for the 5-year model.  This increase suggests 
that prior enlisted officers are slightly more likely to stay in the Marine Corps.  The 6-
year model is completely different.  Approximately 41% of the officers who leave, while 
only 1% who stay are prior enlisted.  This discrepancy could be due to the small 6-year 
sample size. 
For the 5-year model only, there are significant differences in the retention rates 
across the sources of entry.  Approximately 24% of the officers who leave and 37% of 
the officers who stay are OCC.  The percentages for NROTC are approximately the same 
for both officers who stay and leave.  However, the largest numbers of officers who leave 
are from PLC.  Approximately 47% of the officers who leave and only 32% who stay are 
PLC.  
One key element between officers who stay and leave the Marine Corps is the 
difference in deployment time.  Officers who stay in the Marine Corps have 
approximately 350 days of deployment time on average compared to just 239 for the 5-
year model and 304 for the 6-year model for officers who leave the Marine Corps.  This 
trend seems to follow the literature review findings in Chapter III of this thesis that 
suggest that officers who deploy more have a higher retention rate than officers who do 
not deploy as much.   
When the MOS preference variables are compared between the stay and leave 
groups for the 5-year model, there is a positive trend in retention for those that receive 
one of their top three MOS preferences.  Likewise, there is a negative trend for those 
officers that do not receive one of their top three MOS preferences.  Approximately 37% 
of the officers who leave and 34% of those that stay do not receive one of their top three 
MOS preferences.  For the six-year model, the trend is the opposite.  There is a negative 
trend for those officers who receive one of their top three MOS preferences and a positive 
trend for those officers who do not receive one of their top three MOS preferences.  
Approximately 28% of the officers who leave and 36% of the officers who stay do not 
receive one of their top three MOS preferences.   
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Table 8.   Key Variables by Retention 
 5-Year Separated 5-Year Retained USNA Separated USNA Retained 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Female 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.28 0.14 0.34 0.14 0.35
Male 0.91 0.28 0.92 0.28 0.86 0.34 0.86 0.35
White 0.82 0.39 0.78 0.42 0.75 0.43 0.80 0.40
Asian 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.18
Black 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.29 0.13 0.33 0.08 0.26
Hispanic 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.26
AIAN 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00
NHPI 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RaceDeclined 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13
o2_married 0.33 0.47 0.42 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.68 0.47
o2_single 0.65 0.48 0.56 0.50 0.36 0.48 0.28 0.45
o2_divorced 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.21
o2_depndts 0.43 0.77 0.63 0.99 1.25 1.41 1.09 1.24
GCT 124.14 9.94 124.67 9.94 122.91 9.05 122.73 7.57
civmasters 0.01 0.11 0.12 0.32 0.10 0.30 0.29 0.45
Top 0.25 0.43 0.33 0.47 0.36 0.48 0.39 0.49
Middle 0.30 0.46 0.31 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.34 0.47
Lower 0.45 0.50 0.36 0.48 0.34 0.47 0.28 0.45
OCC 0.24 0.43 0.37 0.48         
PLC 0.47 0.50 0.32 0.47      
NROTC 0.29 0.45 0.31 0.46         
Prior Enlisted 0.08 0.27 0.12 0.32 0.41 0.49 0.01 0.08
daysdepl 2.39 3.16 3.44 2.92 3.04 2.94 3.57 2.67
WIA 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.11
First MOS 0.39 0.49 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.43 0.50
Second MOS 0.16 0.37 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.33 0.08 0.27
Third MOS 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.34
Top3MOS 0.63 0.48 0.66 0.47 0.72 0.45 0.64 0.48
OtherMOS 0.37 0.48 0.34 0.47 0.28 0.45 0.36 0.48
  1034  4039  676  173
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V. MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
To assess the effects of MOS placement on retention correctly, the author has 
chosen to use two main retention models: the first for a five-year minimum service 
requirement (MSR) and the second for a six-year MSR.  Officers commissioned from 
NROTC, PLC, or OCC are only included in the five-year MSR model, while officers 
from USNA are only included in the six-year MSR model.  Officers commissioned from 
ECP, MCP, or MECEP are excluded from both models, since these officers will have the 
longest years of service and be closer to career completion.  Since these officers will have 
more completed service, they may be driven more by retirement than commissioned 
officers with no prior service time.  The draw of retirement may bias downward the 
effects of MOS placement on retention.   
A. FIVE-YEAR MINIMUM SERVICE REQUIREMENT RETENTION 
MODELS:  EXCLUDING PRIOR ENLISTED MARINES 
1. Five-Year MSR Retention Model #1, Excluding Priors 
The first version of the Five-Year Retention Model is the simplest model and is 
designed to analyze the effects of job placement on retention based on a Marine’s MOS 
placement compared to his or her MOS preferences, excluding prior enlisted Marines 
from the 5-year MSR sample.  As stated above, prior enlisted Marines may have different 
motivations for retention that may bias the effects on the dependent variable for non-prior 
enlisted Marines.   
The first model includes demographics and general service characteristics to 
factor out observable differences across the sample that may affect the retention 
dependent variable.  The goal of the model is to isolate the effects of MOS placement on 
an officer’s retention decision.  Since the dependent variable is a binary term, a standard 
Probit model is used for each model to capitalize on maximum likelihood techniques and 
obtain more useful marginal effect coefficients.  The first model is specified as the 
following. 
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P(Retained=1⎢x) = φ (βFemale + βBlack + βAsian + βHispanic + βAIAN + βNHPI + 
βRacedeclined + βSingle + βDivorced + βNumber of Dependents + βSecondMOS + 
βThirdMOS + βOtherMOS + βPLC + βOCC + βfy_01 + βfy_02 + βfy_03 + βfy_04 + 
βfy_05 + βfy_07 + βfy_08 + ε) 
 
2. Five-Year MSR Retention Model #2, Excluding Priors:  Ability 
The second model adds an officer’s GCT score and TBS third to the first model to 
determine the effect of these ability variables on retention and the sensitivity of the key 
MOS preference variables to other factors.  The second model is specified below. 
 
P(Retained=1⎢x) = φ (βFemale + βBlack + βAsian + βHispanic + βAIAN + βNHPI + 
βRacedeclined + βSingle + βDivorced + βNumber of Dependents + βSecondMOS + 
βThirdMOS + βOtherMOS + βPLC + βOCC + βfy_01 + βfy_02 + βfy_03 + βfy_04 + 
βfy_05 + βfy_07 + βfy_08 + βGCT + βTop + βLower + ε) 
 
3. Five-Year MSR Retention Model #3, Excluding Priors:  Ability + 
Masters + Service Information 
Building off the first and second models, the third model includes a Marine’s total 
number of deployed days, whether the Marine was wounded in action, and whether the 
Marine ever earned a Master’s degree.  These variables may affect an officer’s decision 
to remain in the Marine Corps.  The third model is specified below. 
P(Retained=1⎢x) = φ (βFemale + βBlack + βAsian + βHispanic + βAIAN + βNHPI + 
βRacedeclined + βSingle + βDivorced + βNumber of Dependents + βSecondMOS + 
βThirdMOS + βOtherMOS + βPLC + βOCC + βfy_01 + βfy_02 + βfy_03 + βfy_04 + 
βfy_05 + βfy_07 + βfy_08 + βGCT + βTop + βLower + βCivmasters + βDaysdepl + 
βWIA + ε) 
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4. Five-Year MSR Model Hypothesized Effects 
Table 9 provides the base group and expected hypothesized effects for selected 
independent variables for each of the Five-Year Retention Models.  A plus sign 
represents an expected positive effect on an individual’s retention decision to stay in the 
Marine Corps beyond the 5-year point.  A minus sign represents an expected negative 
effect on an individual’s retention decision to stay beyond the 5-year point in the Marine 
Corps.  The first column of Table 9 indicates the control group for each variable in the 
model.  The hypothesized effects for each variable are based on the control group, 
holding all other variables constant.   
Table 9.   Five-Year Retention Model Key Variable Hypothesized Effects 
Dependent Variable    Retained ( 1 , 0 ) 
Base Group Explanatory Variable Hypothesized 
Effect 
Male  NA 
 Female - 
White  NA 
 Black - 
 Asian - 
 Hispanic - 
 AIAN - 
 NHPI - 
 RaceDeclined - 
Married  NA 
 Single - 
 Divorced - 
NROTC  NA 
 PLC - 
 OCC - 
First MOS Choice  NA 
 Second MOS Choice - 
 Third MOS Choice - 
 Other MOS Choice - 
Middle Third  NA 
 Top Third + 
 Lower Third - 
No Masters  NA 
 Obtained a Masters  - 
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There are several important differences within the demographic variables that 
may cause a positive or negative effect on the dependent variable.  Since the percentage 
of females that stay in the Marine Corps compared to the initial sample decreases in the 
summary statistics, the author predicts that the independent variable for females will 
show the same trend when compared to males in the regression models.  The same is the 
case for the race/ethnicity variables.  Since the officer corps is predominately white, the 
author predicts that other races/ethnicities will have lower retention rates when compared 
to whites and likewise also predicts that officers who are single or divorced will have 
lower retention rates compared to married Marines.  Officers who are married may 
receive more utility from family services or healthcare.  These benefits may encourage 
married officers to stay in the Marine Corps more than single or divorced Marines.   
The NROTC source of entry program was chosen as the base group for the 5-year 
model because it provides the most comparable level of human capital investment to the 
USNA used in the 6-year model.  Since NROTC provides a higher level of human capital 
investment than PLC or OCC, the author predicts that NROTC will have higher retention 
rates compared to other 5-year MSR programs.   
Among the ability variables, the Master’s degree and TBS third variables may 
have a significant impact on the dependent variable.  Officers who earn a Master’s degree 
may have more opportunities in the civilian job market than officers who do not have a 
Master’s degree.  Thus, a Master’s degree may have a negative effect on retention 
compared to officers who do not earn a Master’s degree.  The comparison between TBS 
thirds is the opposite.  Officers who perform well and achieve a higher rank at TBS, will 
be placed in a higher TBS third.  Since TBS uses academic, military skills, and leadership 
screeners to determine performance, officers who rank in a higher TBS third have proven 
that they have more organizational ability.  These officers should be a better fit for the 
organization, and thus, have higher retention rates.  The author expects that the top TBS 
third will have a higher retention rate compared to the middle TBS third.  Similarly, the 
lower third should have a lower retention rate compared to the middle third.   
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Lastly, MOS placement should have an impact on an officer’s job satisfaction, 
since officers indicate to the Marine Corps during the job placement phase of training 
which MOS’s the officer would prefer.  Thus, an officer who receives his or her first 
MOS preference should have more job satisfaction than an officer who does not.  In 
many cases, the utility between the first three MOS preferences may be fairly similar. 
The author predicts that there will be a slight negative effect on retention for officers who 
receive their second MOS preference.  Likewise, there should also be a slightly larger 
negative effect on the retention of officers who receive their third MOS preference 
compared to those that receive their first MOS preference.  For officers who do not 
receive one of their top three preferences, the author predicts that there will be a larger 
negative effect on retention than compared to officers who do receive one of their top 
three MOS preferences.   
B. FIVE-YEAR MSR RETENTION MODELS:  INCLUDING PRIOR 
ENLISTED MARINES 
The second version of the Five-Year Retention Model includes prior enlisted 
Marines in the five-year retention sample to test the sensitivity of the dependent variable 
Retained and independent MOS preference variables.  Each model from the Five-Year 
Retention Model without prior enlisted series was rerun to include prior enlisted Marines.   
1. Five-Year MSR Retention Model #1, Including Priors 
The first Five-Year Retention Model is the simplest model, which includes basic 
demographic, MOS preference, source of entry, and fiscal year information.  The model 
also includes prior enlisted Marines and is specified below. 
P(Retained=1⎢x) = φ (βFemale + βBlack + βAsian + βHispanic + βAIAN + βNHPI + 
βRacedeclined + βSingle + βDivorced + βNumber of Dependents + βSecondMOS + 
βThirdMOS + βOtherMOS + βPLC + βOCC + βfy_01 + βfy_02 + βfy_03 + βfy_04 + 
βfy_05 + βfy_07 + βfy_08 + ε) 
 64
2. Five-Year MSR Retention Model #2, Including Priors:  Ability 
The second model includes a Marine’s GCT score and TBS third.  The second 
model also includes prior enlisted Marines in the Five-Year Retention Model sample and 
is specified below. 
 
P(Retained=1⎢x) = φ (βFemale + βBlack + βAsian + βHispanic + βAIAN + βNHPI + 
βRacedeclined + βSingle + βDivorced + βNumber of Dependents + βSecondMOS + 
βThirdMOS + βOtherMOS + βPLC + βOCC + βfy_01 + βfy_02 + βfy_03 + βfy_04 + 
βfy_05 + βfy_07 + βfy_08 + βGCT + βTop + βLower + ε)  
 
3. Five-Year MSR Retention Model #3, Including Priors:  Ability + 
Masters + Service Information 
The third model includes a Marine’s Master’s degree information, total days 
deployed, and wounded in action status.  The third model is specified below. 
 
P(Retained=1⎢x) = φ (βFemale + βBlack + βAsian + βHispanic + βAIAN + βNHPI + 
βRacedeclined + βSingle + βDivorced + βNumber of Dependents + βSecondMOS + 
βThirdMOS + βOtherMOS + βPLC + βOCC + βfy_01 + βfy_02 + βfy_03 + βfy_04 + 
βfy_05 + βfy_07 + βfy_08 + βGCT + βTop + βLower + βCivmasters + βDaysdepl + 
βWIA + ε)  
 
C. SIX-YEAR MSR RETENTION MODELS:  EXCLUDING PRIOR 
ENLISTED MARINES 
The Six-Year Retention Models are specified exactly as the Five-Year Retention 
Models to provide an accurate base of comparison between PLC/OCC/NROTC and 




Five-Year Retention Models for testing the sensitivity of the dependent variable Retained 
and independent MOS preference variables when adding prior enlisted Marines to the 
Six-Year Retention Model sample.  
1. Six-Year MSR Retention Model #1, Excluding Priors 
The first Six-Year MSR Model is specified for USNA graduates only.  This 
model is the simplest of the six-year models and includes a Marine’s basic demographic 
information, MOS preference, source of entry, and fiscal year information, but does not 
include prior enlisted Marines.  The first Six-Year Retention Model is specified below. 
P(Retained=1⎢x) = φ (βFemale + βBlack + βAsian + βHispanic + βAIAN + βNHPI + 
βRacedeclined + βSingle + βDivorced + βNumber of Dependents + βSecondMOS + 
βThirdMOS + βOtherMOS + βPLC + βOCC + βfy_01 + βfy_02 + βfy_03 + βfy_04 + 
βfy_05 + βfy_07 + βfy_08 + ε)  
2. Six-Year MSR Retention Model #2, Excluding Priors:  Ability 
The second Six-Year MSR Model is specified for USNA graduates only.  This 
model adds an officer’s GCT score and TBS third to the first model to determine the 
effect of these ability variables on retention and the sensitivity of the key MOS 
preference variables to other factors.  The second model does not include prior enlisted 
Marines and is specified below. 
 
P(Retained=1⎢x) = φ (βFemale + βBlack + βAsian + βHispanic + βAIAN + βNHPI + 
βRacedeclined + βSingle + βDivorced + βNumber of Dependents + βSecondMOS + 
βThirdMOS + βOtherMOS + βPLC + βOCC + βfy_01 + βfy_02 + βfy_03 + βfy_04 + 
βfy_05 + βfy_07 + βfy_08 + βGCT + βTop + βLower + ε)  
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3. Six-Year MSR Retention Model #3, Excluding Priors:  Ability + 
Masters + Service Information 
The third model is specified for USNA graduates only and includes a Marine’s 
Master’s degree information, total days deployed, and wounded in action status.  The 
third model does not include prior enlisted Marines and is specified below. 
 
P(Retained=1⎢x) = φ (βFemale + βBlack + βAsian + βHispanic + βAIAN + βNHPI + 
βRacedeclined + βSingle + βDivorced + βNumber of Dependents + βSecondMOS + 
βThirdMOS + βOtherMOS + βPLC + βOCC + βfy_01 + βfy_02 + βfy_03 + βfy_04 + 
βfy_05 + βfy_07 + βfy_08 + βGCT + βTop + βLower + βCivmasters + βDaysdepl + 
βWIA + ε)  
 
4. Six-Year MSR Model Hypothesized Effects 
Table 10 provides the base group and hypothesized effects for selected 
independent variables for each of the Six-Year Retention Models.  A plus sign represents 
an expected positive effect on an individual’s retention decision to stay in the Marine 
Corps beyond the six-year point.  A minus sign represents an expected negative effect on 
an individual’s retention decision to stay beyond the six-year point in the Marine Corps.  
The first column of Table 10 indicates the control group for each variable in the model.  
The hypothesized effects for each variable are based on the control group, holding all 
other variables constant.   
Table 10.   Six-Year Retention Model Key Variable Hypothesized Effects 
Dependent Variable    Retained ( 1 , 0 ) 
Base Group Explanatory Variable Hypothesized 
Effect 
Male  NA 
 Female - 
White  NA 
 Black - 
 Asian - 
 Hispanic - 
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Dependent Variable    Retained ( 1 , 0 ) 
Base Group Explanatory Variable Hypothesized 
Effect 
 AIAN - 
 NHPI - 
 RaceDeclined - 
Married  NA 
 Single - 
 Divorced - 
First MOS Choice  NA 
 Second MOS Choice - 
 Third MOS Choice - 
 Other MOS Choice - 
Middle Third  NA 
 Top Third + 
 Lower Third - 
No Masters  NA 
 Obtained a Masters  - 
The hypothesized effects of the key independent variables for the Six-Year 
Retention Models are exactly similar to the hypothesized effects for the Five-Year 
Retention Model, except for the source of entry variables.  Since the Six-Year Retention 
Model sample contains only Naval Academy graduates, the Six-Year Retention Model 
does not compare USNA graduates to other sources of entry.  
D. SIX-YEAR MSR RETENTION MODELS:  INCLUDING PRIOR 
ENLISTED MARINES 
1. Six-Year MSR Retention Model #1, Including Priors 
The first Six-Year MSR Model is specified for USNA graduates only and 
includes prior enlisted Marines.  This model is the simplest model and includes a 
Marine’s basic demographic information, MOS preference, source of entry, and fiscal 




P(Retained=1⎢x) = φ (βFemale + βBlack + βAsian + βHispanic + βAIAN + βNHPI + 
βRacedeclined + βSingle + βDivorced + βNumber of Dependents + βSecondMOS + 
βThirdMOS + βOtherMOS + βPLC + βOCC + βfy_01 + βfy_02 + βfy_03 + βfy_04 + 
βfy_05 + βfy_07 + βfy_08 + ε)  
 
2. Six-Year MSR Retention Model #2, Including Priors:  Ability 
The second Six-Year MSR Model includes prior enlisted Marines and is specified 
for USNA graduates only.  This model adds an officer’s GCT score and TBS third to the 
first model and is specified below. 
P(Retained=1⎢x) = φ (βFemale + βBlack + βAsian + βHispanic + βAIAN + βNHPI + 
βRacedeclined + βSingle + βDivorced + βNumber of Dependents + βSecondMOS + 
βThirdMOS + βOtherMOS + βPLC + βOCC + βfy_01 + βfy_02 + βfy_03 + βfy_04 + 
βfy_05 + βfy_07 + βfy_08 + βGCT + βTop + βLower + ε)  
3. Six-Year MSR Retention Model #3, Excluding Priors:  Ability + 
Masters + Service Information 
The third model is specified for USNA graduates only and includes a Marine’s 
Master’s degree information, total days deployed, and wounded in action status.  The 
third model includes prior enlisted Marines and is specified below. 
 
P(Retained=1⎢x) = φ (βFemale + βBlack + βAsian + βHispanic + βAIAN + βNHPI + 
βRacedeclined + βSingle + βDivorced + βNumber of Dependents + βSecondMOS + 
βThirdMOS + βOtherMOS + βPLC + βOCC + βfy_01 + βfy_02 + βfy_03 + βfy_04 + 
βfy_05 + βfy_07 + βfy_08 + βGCT + βTop + βLower + βCivmasters + βDaysdepl + 
βWIA + ε)  
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
There are two major types of models outlined in this chapter for officers that will 
reach five-year and six-year retention decisions.  For both the five-year and six-year 
models, the same series of models are used for each group to provide a way to compare 
the effects of MOS placement on retention for both groups and to test the sensitivity of 
the dependent variable Retained and MOS preference independent variables when new 
independent variables are introduced.   
For each MSR group, prior enlisted Marines are excluded from the initial models 
since prior enlisted Marines may have different motivations for staying in the Marine 
Corps past the initial MSR.  The prior enlisted Marines are then added to both MSR 
samples and the series of models are run again to determine if a difference exists in the 
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VI. REGRESSION MODEL RESULTS   
A. FIVE-YEAR RETENTION MODEL KEY VARIABLE RESULTS, 
WITHOUT PRIOR ENLISTED MARINES 
The dependent variable for each of the Five-Year Retention Models that excludes 
prior enlisted Marines is ‘Retained’, which is constructed using a five-year MSR for 
PLC, OCC, and NROTC graduates.  Table 11 provides the regression table results for the 
three Five-Year Retention Models that exclude prior enlisted Marines from the sample.  
Column 1 provides the independent variables for each of the models used.  The 
remaining columns provide the Probit regression coefficients, with standard errors in 
parenthesis and partial effects in brackets, for each of the models outlined in Chapter V in 
order of progression.   
Table 11.   Five-Year Retention Model Results without Prior Enlisted Marines  
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) 
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 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) 
Independent Variables 5-Year Retained 5-Year Retained 5-Year Retained 
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 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) 
Independent Variables 5-Year Retained 5-Year Retained 5-Year Retained 
Year 2004 [-0.00870] [-0.00962] [-0.01890] 
    












    












    












    






    






    






    
Ever Obtained a Masters   1.06890 
(0.13374)*** 
[0.17986] 
    
Total Days Deployed   0.09481 
(0.00813)*** 
[0.02512] 
    
Constant 1.07259 1.51179 1.16163 
 (0.09841)*** (0.32705)*** (0.33923)*** 
Observations 4508 4508 4443 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
Partial Effects in brackets 
   
* significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 




Based on the regression results in Table 11, the Female independent variable has a 
large positive value for each of the models used when compared to males.  As more 
independent variables are introduced, the coefficient for the Female variable increases.  
However, the Female variable is insignificant for the first two models and is only 
significant at the 10% level for the final model.  Since the Female variable is only weakly 
significant for the final model, the author concludes that gender is not a major factor in 
the retention decision for officers in the five-year MSR category.   
2. Race/Ethnicity 
For each of the Five-Year Retention Models that excludes prior enlisted Marines, 
several of the race/ethnicity variables appear to have no effect on a Marine’s retention 
decision when compared to whites.  For the Hispanic, American Indian and Alaska 
Native, Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander, and RaceDeclined independent variables, 
there are no significant effects.  For the Hispanic and RaceDeclined variables, the Probit 
coefficients are positive, but not significant.  For the NHPI and AIAN variables, the 
Probit coefficients are negative, but not significant.  
The results are significant, however, for Blacks and Asians compared to Whites.  
For both variables, there are positive and significant effects at the 5% level of 
significance for each model.  The Black variable has a .04563 partial effect for the first 
model, .05771 partial effect for the second model, and a .05007 partial effect for the final 
model.  For each model, the independent variable Black is significant at the 5% level.  
The Asian variable has a .09614 partial effect for the first model, a .10306 partial effect 
for the second model, and a .09332 partial effect for the final model.  For each model, the 
Asian independent variable is significant at the 5% level.  These results show that race 
has an important positive effect on the retention decisions for Marines who consider 
themselves to be Black or Asian.   
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3. MOS Placement  
When compared to Marines who receive their first MOS preference, there are 
several key differences for Marines who may have received their second MOS 
preference, third MOS preference, or an MOS preference outside of their top three 
choices denoted as ‘OtherMOS.’  For Marines who receive their third MOS preference, 
MOS placement does not appear to be a significant factor in the Marine’s retention 
decision, as the variable is not significant for any of the Five-Year Retention Models.   
The independent variable for second MOS preference is negative and significant 
for the first two models at the 5% level.  The partial effect for second MOS preference for 
the first model is -.04323, and -.03852 for the second model.  The second MOS 
preference variable is not significant, however, for the final model, which includes days 
deployed and Master’s degree information. 
The OtherMOS preference variable has similar attributes as the second MOS 
preference variable, but is much more significant for the first model.  Like the second 
MOS variable, the OtherMOS variable is negative and significant for the first two 
models.  The important difference is that the OtherMOS variable is significant at the 1% 
level of significance for the first model and significant at the 5% level for the second 
model.  When days deployed and Master’s degree information are included in the final 
model, the OtherMOS is no longer significant.   
Both the days deployed and Master’s degree information variables are positive 
and significant at the 1% level of test significance.  The Probit partial effect for days 
deployed is .02512 and the Master’s degree partial effect is .17986.  These variables may 
mitigate the effects of MOS placement based on their test significance.  
B. FIVE-YEAR RETENTION MODEL KEY VARIABLE RESULTS, WITH 
PRIOR ENLISTED MARINES IN THE SAMPLE 
Table 12 provides the regression table results for each of the Five-Year Retention 
Models, including a variable for prior enlisted service.  The sample size increases from 
4,508 to 5,073.  The first column provides the independent variables for each of the 
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models used.  The remaining columns provide the Probit regression coefficients, with 
standard errors in parenthesis and partial effects in brackets for each of the models 
outlined in Chapter V in order of progression.   
Table 12.   Five-Year Retention Model Results with Prior Enlisted Marines  
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) 










    









    









    









    











    











    









    









    











    









    
Received Second MOS -0.14181 -0.12622 -0.10843 
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 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) 







    











    
Did Not Receive One of Top 
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 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) 
Independent Variables 5-Year Retained 5-Year Retained 5-Year Retained 
[-0.00045] [-0.00024] 
    






    






    
Ever Obtained a Masters   1.13227 
(0.13045)*** 
[0.17392] 
    
Total Days Deployed   0.09198 
(0.00771)*** 
[0.02316] 









Observations 5073 5073 5073 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
Partial Effects in brackets 
   
* significant at 10%;  
** significant at 5%;  
*** significant at 1% 
   
1. Gender 
When prior enlisted Marines are added to the Five-Year Retention Model sample, 
the effects of gender remain the same.  The independent variable Female is not a 
significant factor in the retention decision of Marines when compared to the male base 
group for any of the five-year models.   
2. Race/Ethnicity 
There are several differences across the race/ethnic variables after including prior 
enlisted Marines to the Five-Year Retention Model.  The variables for Hispanic, NHPI, 
and RaceDeclined are still not significant for any model.  These variables do not effect a  
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Marine’s decision to stay in the Marine Corps.  The variable AIAN, however, is 
significant to the 10% level of test significance for the first model, but is insignificant for 
the following two models.   
The variables for Black and Asian remain positive and significant for each of the 
models, with slight changes in significance between models and a slight reduction in the 
partial effect coefficients for each model.  The Probit partial effect coefficient for Blacks 
for the first prior enlisted model is .03557 compared to .04563 for the model without 
prior enlisted included.  Another key difference between the first model with and without 
prior enlisted Marines is the level of significance.  For the first model with prior enlisted 
included, Black is significant at the 10% level vice the 5% level for the model without 
priors included.  Likewise, the second model partial effect is .05087, compared to .05771 
from the model without prior enlisted.  The third model partial effect is .04228, compared 
to .05007 for the model without prior enlisted.  
For the Asian variable, the Probit partial effect for the first model is .09347 
compared to .09614 in the model without prior enlisted, .09982 for the second compared 
to .1036 in the model without priors, and .08674 for the final model compared to .09332 
in the model without priors.  For each model, the introduction of prior enlisted Marines 
reduces the partial effects of race and ethnicity on retention.   
3. MOS Placement  
Similar to the race variables, the inclusion of prior enlisted Marines in the Five-
Year Retention Model changes the significance and partial effects of several of the MOS 
preference variables.  The variable for third MOS preference does not change.  
However, the second MOS preference variable becomes significant not only in 
the first and second models, but in the final model as well.  However, the second MOS 
preference variable is only significant at the 10% level in the final model.  The Probit 
partial effects are also lower when the prior enlisted are included.  For the second MOS 
preference variable, the partial effects are -.04054 compared to -.04323 in the model 
without priors, -.03581 compared to -.03852 in the model without priors, and -.02831 
compared to -.02996, which is insignificant, for the final model without priors.  
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Similarly, the addition of prior enlisted Marines has the same effect for 
‘OtherMOS’.  For the first and second models, OtherMOS is significant at the 5% level 
of test significance.  However, the partial effects of OtherMOS are reduced by the 
inclusion of prior enlisted Marines.  The OtherMOS partial effects are -.03666 compared 
to -.03907 in the first model without priors and -.02890 compared to -.03128 in the 
second model without priors.   
C. SIX-YEAR RETENTION MODEL KEY VARIABLE RESULTS, 
WITHOUT PRIOR ENLISTED MARINES 
The dependent variable for each of the Six-Year Retention Models that exclude 
prior enlisted Marines is ‘Retained’, which is constructed using a six-year MSR for 
USNA graduates.  Table 13 provides the regression table results for each of the Six-Year 
Retention Models that exclude prior enlisted.  The first column provides the independent 
variables for each of the models used.  The remaining columns provide the Probit 
regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis, and partial effects in brackets for 
each of the models outlined in Chapter V in order of progression.   
Table 13.   Six-Year Retention Model Results without Prior Enlisted Marines  
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) 
Independent 
Variables 










    









    









    









    










 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) 
Independent 
Variables 
6-Year Retained 6-Year Retained 6-Year Retained 
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 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) 
Independent 
Variables 
6-Year Retained 6-Year Retained 6-Year Retained 
    






    
Ever Obtained a 
Masters 
  0.89477 
(0.22639)*** 
[0.34479] 
    
Total Days Deployed   0.12141 
(0.02460)*** 
[0.04537] 
    
Wounded In Action   0.72393 
(0.94837) 
[0.28262] 
    
Constant 0.81219 3.97308 3.02627 
 (0.26971)*** (1.21111)*** (1.28423)** 
Observations 395 395 395 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
Partial effects in 
brackets 
   
* significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
   
1. Gender 
Based on the regression results for the Six-Year Retention Model that excludes 
prior enlisted Marines, the Female independent variable has a negative coefficient in the 
first two models and a positive value in the final model, when compared to the base 
group males, but is not significant for any model.   
2. Race/Ethnicity 
When comparing other Non-White groups to Whites for USNA graduates, none 
of the race/ethnic variables are significant for any of the models.   
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3. MOS Placement  
For the Six-Year Retention Model without prior enlisted Marines, the third MOS 
preference variable is the only variable of the three MOS preference variables with 
significant effects.  The second MOS preference variable and the OtherMOS variable do 
not have significant effects on a Marine’s decision to stay in the Marine Corps for any 
model.  For the third MOS preference variable, there are no significant effects for the first 
retention model.  For the second model, the partial effect is .17857, but is only significant 
at the 10% level of test significance.  Likewise, the partial effect of the third MOS 
preference variable for the third model is .18972, but is only significant at the 10% level 
of test significance.  Even though the third MOS preference variable appears to have a 
large significant effect on a Marine USNA graduates decision to stay in the Marine 
Corps, the effect is weakly significant at only the 10% level of test significance.  
D. SIX-YEAR RETENTION MODEL KEY VARIABLE RESULTS, WITH 
PRIOR ENLISTED MARINES 
Table 14 provides the regression table results for each of the Six-Year Retention 
Models that include prior enlisted Marines.  The first column provides the independent 
variables for each of the models used.  The sample size increases from 395 to 646 when 
prior enlisted are included.  The remaining columns provide the Probit regression 
coefficients, with standard errors in parenthesis and partial effects in brackets for each of 
the models outlined in Chapter V in order of progression.   
Table 14.   Six-Year Retention Model Results with Prior Enlisted Marines  
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) 
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 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) 
Independent Variables 6-Year Retained 6-Year Retained 6-Year Retained 
6-yr point from 











    






    






    






    
Ever Obtained a Masters   0.72060 
(0.19154)*** 
[0.17808] 
    
Total Days Deployed   0.11283 
(0.02299)*** 
[0.02105] 
    
Wounded In Action   0.42590 
(0.68518) 
[0.10009] 







    
Observations 646 646 646 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
Partial effects in brackets 
   
* significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
   
1. Gender 
Based on the regression results for the Six-Year Retention Model with the prior 
enlisted service variable, the Female independent variable has a negative coefficient for 
each of the models used when compared to the base group males, but is not significant 
for any model.   
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2. Race/Ethnicity 
When comparing Non-Whites to Whites for USNA graduates, none of the 
race/ethnic variables is significant for any of the models.   
3. MOS Placement  
Similar to the Six-Year Retention Model without prior enlisted Marines included, 
the third MOS preference variable for the Six-Year Retention Model with prior enlisted 
Marine included is the only variable of the three MOS preference variables with 
significant effects.  The second MOS preference variable and OtherMOS variable do not 
have significant effects on a Marine’s decision to stay in the Marine Corps for any model.  
For the third MOS preference variable, there are no significant effects for the first 
retention model.  For the second model, the partial effect is .10460 compared to .17857 in 
the model without priors.  Likewise, the partial effect of the third MOS preference 
variable for the third model is .10079 compared to .18972 in the model without priors.  
For both models, the partial effects are only significant at the 10% level of test 
significance.  The partial effect coefficients for the six-year model without prior enlisted 
Marines were dramatically reduced when prior enlisted Marines were included in the Six-
Year Retention Model sample.  However, even though the third MOS preference variable 
appears to have a large significant effect on a Marine USNA graduate’s decision to stay 
in the Marine Corps, the effect is weak at the 10% level of test significance.  
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the results of the five-year regression models with and without 
prior enlisted Marines are provided along with the results from the six-year regression 
models with and without prior enlisted Marines included.  For the Five-Year Retention 
Model excluding prior enlisted Marines, gender and race have only positive effects when 
compared to the base group White males on a Marine’s decision to stay in the Marine 
Corps.  The Black and Asian race variables indicate a strong positive effect on a Marine’s 
decision to remain in the Marine Corps.   
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Job placement is also a significant factor in the five-year models.  For Marines 
who do not receive one of their top three MOS preferences, there are strong negative 
effects due to job placement on their retention decision.  When prior enlisted Marines are 
included in the five-year models, there are similar results for race, gender, and MOS 
placement compared to the five-year model without priors; however, the overall 
coefficients for the partial effects are reduced.  There are strong negative effects on a 
Marine’s retention decision for those who do not receive one of their top three MOS 
preferences. 
For the Six-Year Retention Models that excludes prior enlisted Marines, gender, 
race, and MOS preferences do not have a significant effect on a Marine’s retention 
decision.  Similar to the Five-Year Retention Model, the introduction of prior enlisted 
Marines to the Six-Year Retention Models has a dampening effect on the partial effect 
coefficients.  There are, however, no significant effects on a Marine’s retention decision 
for those officers who do not receive one of their top three MOS preferences for each of 
the six-year models.   
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VII.   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
To determine the effects of MOS placement on retention, two separate Probit 
models were constructed based on an officer’s Minimum Service Requirement (MSR) 
using data from the Center of Naval Analyses and the Marine Corps Total Force Data 
Warehouse.  The first Probit model was designed to determine the effects of MOS 
placement on the retention of officers with a four-year MSR with one additional year to 
account for any variance in the time to separation due to operational commitments.  The 
five-year model includes only officers commissioned from OCC, PLC, and NROTC.  
The second Probit model includes only officers who graduated from the United States 
Naval Academy and is constructed for a five-year MSR, with one additional year to 
account for variance in time to separation.   
Three progressive Probit models were then constructed for both the five-year and 
six-year models.  The three models for each of the MSR groups are exactly the same to 
provide an accurate base of comparison between the five and six-year MSR models.  The 
first model includes demographics, sources of entry, MOS preferences, and retention 
fiscal year dummies.  The second model includes three ability variables based on an 
officer’s GCT score and TBS third.  The final model includes wounded in action status, 
days deployed, and Master’s degree information.   
Initially, prior enlisted Marines were excluded from both the five- and six-year 
samples.  After each MSR model was run without prior enlisted Marines in the sample, 
prior enlisted Marines were then added back to both the five and six-year samples.  Both 
models were then re-run to test the sensitivity of the dependent variables and the MOS 
placement variables to the inclusion of prior enlisted personnel.   
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B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. MOS Placement 
The effect of MOS placement on a Marine’s retention decision is greatly affected 
if a Marine does not receive one of his or her top three MOS preferences.  For the five-
year model, the effect of receiving an MOS outside of a Marine’s top three choices is 
negative and significant to the 1% level of test significance for the first model and to the 
5% level for the second.  However, when variables for days deployed and Master’s 
degree information were added, the effects of MOS placement were mitigated.  The 
introduction of prior enlisted Marines to the five-year sample produced basically the 
same results, but the partial effect coefficients were much smaller for each significant 
variable.   
For the six-year model, MOS placement does not seem to have a significant effect 
on the retention decision of USNA graduates.  Even though the summary statistics show 
that there is a positive trend in retention for those officers that do not receive one of their 
top three MOS preferences, the OtherMOS variable, representing Marines who did not 
receive one of their top three MOS choices, was insignificant in each of the three six-year 
models.  When prior enlisted Marines were added to the six-year model sample, the 
partial effect of the OtherMOS variable was greatly reduced in the same way as in the 
five-year models, but it was still insignificant.   
One argument for a lack of significant results in the six-year model may be due to 
the small sample size for USNA graduates.  The data restrictions due to lack of MOS 
preference data, the truncation of fiscal year cohorts due to officers not reaching the MSR 
requirement, and the small number of USNA graduates that enter the Marines each year 
dramatically reduced the overall sample size for the six-year model.  The effect of MOS 
placement outside of a Marine’s top three MOS preferences may be an important factor 
in a Marine’s retention decision for USNA graduates; however, the small sample size 




shortfall would be to allow for more year cohorts in the sample.  As more and more 
midshipmen graduate from the Naval Academy, there will be more officers to use in the 
six-year sample.   
Another argument for the lack of significant results may be that the USNA is a 
distinctly different source of commissioning.  Officers who attend USNA receive a much 
higher level of human capital investment compared to other commissioning sources.  The 
Marine Corps requires a longer return on investment from this commissioning source in 
the form of a longer MSR.  Since USNA graduates receive a much more intense training 
schedule, these officers may be more institutionally driven than occupationally driven.65  
If these officers are more institutionally driven, this difference may explain why these 
officers are impacted less by MOS placement than other sources of entry.  For either 
argument, the author recommends that more officer cohorts be added to both the five- 
and six-year model to allow for more accurate estimates of the effects of MOS placement 
on the retention decisions of junior officers.  
Another reason for adding more officer cohorts to the models is due to 
optimization process for the TBS job placement process.  As outlined in Chapter II, 
approximately 75% of each TBS cohort will receive their top three MOS preferences.  
This percentage leaves approximately 25% of officers in each cohort that will not receive 
one of their top three MOS preferences.  The optimization process may help to reduce the 
overall effect of MOS placement on an officer’s job satisfaction, since approximately 
83% of officers will receive an MOS within their top five choices and 93% will receive 
an MOS within their top 10 choices.66  One limitation of this thesis is that MOS 
preferences are only maintained for a Marine’s top three preferences.  The author 
recommends that CNA maintain MOS preferences for at least the top 10 MOS 
preferences.  This data will allow for more accurate estimates on the effects of MOS 
placement and reduce the overall burden for data management.  
                                                 
65 Charles C. Moskos “Institutional/Occupational Trends in Armed Forces: An Update,” Armed 
Forces & Society (Spring 1986): 378-379. 
66 The Basic School, http://www.tbs.usmc.mil/All_MOS_Assignment_Process. 
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2. Gender 
When compared to males in the five-year models without prior enlisted Marines, 
the Female variable did not have any significant effect on retention for the first two 
models.  In the final model, the Female variable had a positive, but weak effect on a 
Marine’s retention decision.  When prior enlisted Marines were included in the five-year 
sample, the Female variable continued to be positive, but was not a significant factor in a 
Marine’s retention decision.  When compared to males in the six-year models with and 
without prior enlisted Marines, the Female variable was not a significant factor in a 
Marine’s retention decision.  Even though the summary statistics show that females have 
a slightly lower retention rate compared to males, it appears that gender does not have a 
significant effect on a Marine’s retention decision.  
3. Race/Ethnicity 
For the five-year models with and without prior enlistees in the sample, being 
Black or Asian has a strong positive effect on an officer’s retention decision.  This result 
is further emphasized by the summary statistics that show that these two races have 
higher retention rates compared to Whites.  The inclusion of prior enlistees may reduce 
the overall magnitude of the coefficients of the race/ethnic variables, but the significance 
of the variables remains the same.  For the six-year models with and without prior 
enlistees, however, there are no effects due to race.  
C. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
During the course of this thesis, the author discovered several areas of interest that 
were beyond the scope of this research, but may have a relevant place in future research.  
The following sections provide an insight to those issues and the possibilities for future 
opportunities.   
1. The Effects of MOS Placement on Alternative Career Paths 
When the civmasters variable was added to the final five-year model with and 
without prior enlisted Marines, the effects of MOS placement were completely mitigated.  
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However, the civmasters variable had a very large positive effect that was significant at 
the 1% level for both retention models.  The partial effect of civmasters for the five-year 
model without prior enlisted Marines was .17986 versus .17392 for the model with prior 
enlisted Marines.  The partial effect coefficient for the six-year model without prior 
enlisted Marines was .34479 versus .17808 for the model with prior enlisted Marines. 
One significant limitation for the civmasters variable was that the author could not 
distinguish degrees earned from the Naval Postgraduate School under the Special 
Education Program or International Affairs Officer Program from Master’s degree earned 
from civilian institutions out of the 607 Marines who earned a Master’s degree in the 
sample.  For both programs, a Marine must self-select the program and the Marine will 
automatically incur a new minimum service obligation.  For these cases, a Marine will 
automatically remain in the Marine Corps beyond the initial MSR.  
Marines who may not be satisfied or have a poor job fit may still wish to remain 
in the Marine Corps, but under an alternative career path.  Programs such as SEP and 
IAOP may provide Marines with an outlet to relieve job dissatisfaction while remaining 
in the institution.  This proposed effect might explain the extreme positive effect of 
civmasters on the retention decision of Marines.  The author recommends that future 
research examine this trend to determine the true effects of civilian education on the 
retention of junior officers.   
2. A Cost Benefit Analysis Based on MOS Preferences 
Based on the findings, MOS placement does have a significant negative impact on 
an officer’s retention decision.  However, what this thesis cannot provide is the economic 
impact poor MOS placement has on the Marine Corps.  The Marine Corps invests a large 
amount of capital to recruit and train its officer cohorts.  Approximately 25% of each 
officer cohort will receive an MOS outside of his or her top three MOS preferences.  
Even though the Marine Corps is highly successful at placing officers in one of their top 
preferences, there still exists a large number of Marines who may be dissatisfied with 
their MOS placements.  
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Aside from the cost of recruitment and training, one potential cost could be the 
loss of Marines from the top third of each TBS class due to MOS placement.  These 
officers have higher retention rates and performance evaluations, on average, than 
officers from the middle or lower thirds.  These officers have also demonstrated that they 
have higher academic, physical, and military skills abilities during their course of training 
at TBS.  Since the TBS Company staff’s evaluations also contribute to each officer’s 
placement, officers from the top third have also demonstrated stronger leadership ability.  
Thus, the loss of officers from the top third may be may be greater to the Marine Corps 
than the loss of officers from the middle or lower thirds.  A cost benefit analysis would 
provide a better understanding of the actual costs associated with poor job placement 
during the job placement process.   
3. Process Analysis 
The Marine Corps operates under a closed loop personnel system, which requires 
a large number of applicants at the initial point of entry to ensure that enough personnel 
survive through the career process, due to various forms of attrition, and to meet internal 
labor market requirements for mid to upper personnel system echelons.  Likewise, the 
Marine Corps invests a great deal of capital to recruit and train these entry-level officers, 
with the assumption that the Marine Corps will not retain every officer.  
Additionally, the pool of officers available for internal Marine Corps labor 
markets is relatively small.  Although the officers that constitute this pool are highly 
qualified, the assumption is that the Marine Corps will want the highest quality Marines 
from this group to fill its billets.  Attrition reduces the total number of highly qualified 
Marines available in this pool.  In this sense, the Marine Corps is still competing with the 
civilian labor market for personnel.  One way to increase the quality of the labor market 
is to target high-quality officers with incentives, such as bonuses.  However, there may be 
other ways to improve the labor pool, by targeting high quality officers with other 
incentives, such the Special Education Program and International Affairs Officer 
Program.   
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Since the Marine Corps uses such a small number of officers to meet future 
personnel requirements, there may be opportunities within the current personnel process 
to maximize the quality of officers within the retention pool and carve out a better market 
share of its officer cohorts for retention.  Based on the summary statistics, a large 
percentage of officers within each TBS third will not receive their top MOS preferences.  
A process analysis could provide insights and recommendations on how to improve the 
personnel process, by moving program applications or adding other incentives, to 
maximize the highest quality officers in the available labor pool.  Changing the process 
could offer the Marine Corps a distinct competitive advantage by providing a higher 
quality labor pool, potential recruiting and training cost savings, and non-bonus 
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APPENDIX.  TYPICAL OCCUPATIONAL CAREER PATHS67 
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